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ABSTRACT 
 
Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin (rBST) is a biotechnology for increasing 
milk production in dairy cattle. The purpose of this research was to investigate and to 
build a better understanding of the complexities and controversies around this product in 
Canada. To accomplish this, I examined the Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture 
and Forestry’s inquiry into rBST and the drug approval process. I compared and 
contrasted the testimony of witnesses and Senators and I uncovered emerging issues, 
patterns, and themes. This research was an exploratory and qualitative exercise that 
analyzed how the participants of this Senate inquiry conceptualized and contested the 
meaning of science, safety, and the state’s regulatory functions.  
 This research revealed several commonalities between Health Canada 
management, the human safety panel, and industry representatives. These witnesses 
argued that the drug approval process must be efficient, standard-driven, and based upon 
available scientific studies. These witnesses stated that they had confidence in the 
neutrality and competency of internal standard setting-agencies.  They emphasized 
transparency rather than public participation in the drug approval process. Health and 
safety were conceptualized as static phenomena to be measured and evaluated by 
experts.  
In contrast, Health Canada employees had several commonalities with the 
Senators, dairy representatives, and witnesses from citizen interest groups. Their 
testimony supports the argument that health and safety are dynamic social constructs. 
These actors transformed the boundaries of science to accommodate their precautionary 
framing of safety.  They highlighted several problems with Canada’s science-based 
regulatory framework and demanded that they have a decisive voice in the rBST 
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decision. They challenged the hegemony of industrial capitalism by combining both 
scientific and lay knowledge to expose the limits and contradictions of industrialized 
agriculture.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Description of the Problem 
 Recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST) is a genetically engineered drug to 
increase milk productivity in dairy cattle. In 1990, the Monsanto Corporation sought to 
have their rBST product (trade name Nutrilac) approved for sale and use in Canada. 
Health Canada, the government agency responsible for licensing this drug, was severely 
criticized for its handling of this drug.  Ultimately, Health Canada took nine years to 
decide the fate of Monsanto’s rBST submission, and in 1999 decided not to approve it 
for use in Canada.   
The rBST case challenged the credibility of Health Canada because not only was 
there a lack of scientific consensus on rBST’s safety but also because this drug came to 
symbolize broader economic, political, and social issues. Canada’s dairy industry was 
concerned over rBST’s socio-economic impacts. Many dairy producers perceived the 
economic benefits proposed by Monsanto as risks. These risks included a further decline 
of smaller family dairy farms, decreased consumer confidence, and a further drop in 
export milk prices due to adding more milk to an existing oversupply. With the benefits 
of rBST blurred, many Canadians also questioned whether or not any risk to human 
health would be worth taking. The rBST controversy is a debate about the extent to 
which science alone should judge the acceptability of this drug (MacDonald 2001; Mills 
2002; and Jones 2001).
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rBST was one of the first major genetically engineered products introduced to 
Canada’s regulatory system. In many respects, Canadians perceived rBST as a test case 
for the adequacy of Canada’s regulatory system to handle the predicted flood of 
genetically engineered products to come. As one of the first genetically engineered 
products, rBST was arguably a test case for industry’s success in getting genetically 
engineered products on the market. Turner (2001b) suggests that Health Canada’s 
decision to ban rBST perhaps blunted Monsanto’s and other corporation’s commercial 
pursuit of biotechnologies. Whether or not this single case blunted corporate investments 
into biotechnologies is debatable, but nonetheless this case study demonstrates the 
impact of this single drug on much larger questions about the state’s regulatory agencies 
and the political economy in which they operate.  
Canada’s experience with rBST reveals much about the appropriateness and 
applicability of the insights of post-normal science as a tool for explaining regulatory 
debates. The Senate inquiry allows for an excellent examination of this because it is a 
situation where participants struggle with trying to use the traditional model of scientific 
inquiry in order to make a decision about an anything but “normal” product. The rBST 
Senate inquiry highlighted the presence of the following four dimensions contributing to 
the complexity around rBST: uncertain facts, disputed values, high decision stakes, and 
urgent decisions.  
 
1.2 Purpose and Objectives 
There are clearly defined testing procedures a veterinary drug must undergo to be 
deemed acceptable in the marketplace (MacDonald 2001). Quantitative investigations 
into degrees and probabilities of harm and injury are key activities in deciding courses of 
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action to take with veterinary drugs. The rBST case however, challenged Health 
Canada’s science-based regulatory mandates for assessing and approving veterinary 
drugs in unique ways (MacDonald 2001, Mills 2002, and Jones 2001).  
Although there were many different actors testifying and raising different issues 
at the Senate inquiry, I have decided to limit my focus to issues specific to Health 
Canada’s roles, responsibilities, credibility, and capabilities. There are two primary 
levels of analysis research takes. At one level, this research is concerned with identifying 
and examining the differences and similarities within Health Canada with respect to how 
new veterinary drugs are treated. At a second level, this research explores the 
expectations, interpretations, and criticism of non-Health Canada participants, including 
the Senators, in regards to Health Canada’s performance at the Senate inquiry, as well as 
the events prior to this inquiry. 
More specifically the objectives of this research are: 
1. To explore the meanings and values that Health Canada actors attribute to the 
science-based decision making process for approving veterinary drugs. 
Furthermore, to explore how politics, economics, and social dynamics are 
interfaced with these scientific evaluations. 
2. To identify where Health Canada actors turn for information and advice when 
making judgments regarding the risks and benefits of rBST, and to uncover the 
motives for their choices.  
3. To examine the interpretations formed and areas of contestation raised by non-
Health Canada witnesses in reaction to the different actors within Health Canada.  
More specifically, to compare and contrast the representations of the risks and 
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benefits of rBST between non-Health Canada witnesses and Health Canada 
witnesses.  
4. To isolate the institutional barriers Health Canada witnesses identify and 
struggle with in an effort to make what they deem as the best possible regulatory 
decision.  
This research is an exploration into the difficulties Health Canada’s management 
and rank-and-file scientists encountered when making a regulatory decision on Nutrilac, 
Monsanto’s trade name for their rBST product. As well this research explores the 
reactions of other witnesses to Health Canada’s handling of the rBST file. The primary 
objective is to examine discursive practices and the maintenance of and resistance to the 
practices and ways of thinking within Health Canada.  In order to provide insight into 
this, I have chosen to conduct a discourse analysis of the Standing Senate Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry inquiry into rBST and the drug approval process. The Senate 
inquiry began on 14 June 1998 with a total of eight different sessions with the last 
session on 13 May 1999. 
This research aims to demonstrate that the authority of scientific knowledge is 
not absolute, but rather that such authority is contingent upon a variety of discursive 
practices. More specifically, this research will uncover the discursive means by which 
actors construct meanings of the risks and benefits of rBST. Moreover, this research will 
highlight important barriers to consensus and satisfactory closures due to differences in 
risk perceptions and representations among the regulator, the regulated, and other 
affected parties.  
This research examines the discourses of Health Canada personnel at the Senate 
inquiry with the intent of uncovering whether the basic tenets of post-normal science are 
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being posed in an informal sense and the resistance to such a possibility. In order to 
provide insight into this, I have chosen to employ Foucault’s theoretical approach on 
discourse, knowledge and power, and Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. 
 
1.3. Methods 
Discourse analysis is the means by which I identify and analyze themes and 
issues in the Senate inquiry. Before I discuss the specific methods and procedures used, 
it is imperative to provide a general introduction to the meaning and significance of 
discourse.   
 To provide a broad definition, discourse is a “bounded body of knowledge and 
associated practices, a particular identifiable way of giving meaning to reality via words 
or imagery” (Lupton 1999: 15). Discourse is grounded in language use and is a way 
people interpret information and construct coherent understanding and accounts of 
events and phenomena (Dryzek 1997). 
According to Black (2002) discourses perform three functions. Discourses are 
constitutive, functional, and coordinative. Discourses can be viewed as a mirror on 
reality. Discourses, or the way we construct knowledge, is based on reality. Discourses, 
several scholars (e.g. Black 2002, Fairclough 1992) argue are more than mere 
reflections, but also a constructive force shaping (if not creating) reality. Discourse 
builds objects, identities, relationships, and ideas.   Black (2002) describes discourse as 
having a functional purpose to achieve certain ends. Lastly, Black (2002: 165) asserts 
that discourse requires and produces coordination for creating meaning and “shared 
senses” of social life.  
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According to O’Mahony and Skillington (1999), ideologies are activated through 
discourses in various roles: explanatory, evaluative, orientative, and the pragmatic. 
These roles give actors an ideological programme for social and political action. 
O’Mahony and Skillington (1999) also argue that how an actor presents issues is not 
only contingent upon immediate factors but also wider cultural and social systems of 
meaning. 
Foucault builds upon this general sense of discourse with the insight that 
discourses are historically specific ways of defining knowledge and truth (Carabine 
2001). Power is central to Foucault’s understanding of discourse as he argued, “There 
can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth 
which operates through and on the basis of this association” (Foucault 1980: 93). Power 
is implicated in discourses by setting limits and establishing procedures to what can be 
said, by whom, and when (Fairclough 1992).  
Discourses are more than resources enabling a researcher to describe the attitudes 
and perspectives of social actors; they are in and of themselves topics of inquiry (Gilbert 
and Mulkay 1984). According to Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) discourse analysis is 
different from traditional social inquiry where a researcher collects participant 
statements in order to assemble an account of what happened. Discourse analysis instead 
studies statements and actions of participants in order to uncover how discourse is 
organized in contextually appropriate or inappropriate ways (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984). 
I elaborate on the above by applying O’Mahony and Skillington’s (1999: 100) 
contention that “scientific disputes are not resolved simply by reference to scientific 
‘facts’, but by the adoption of rhetorical strategies that weave together ideological 
elements in a manner designed to shape public discourse and gain legitimation.”    
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My research is concerned with variability of expert discourses and Foucault has a 
particular appeal because of his emphasis on the discontinuities of discourses.  The 
discontinuous and fragmentary nature of a discourse is, according to Foucault, of equal 
importance if not more than its continuities.  Foucault poses an interesting question that 
guides my analysis: “How is it that at certain moments and at certain orders of 
knowledge, there are sudden take-offs, these hastenings of evolution, these 
transformations which fail to correspond to the calm, continuist image that is normally 
accredited (Rabinow 1984:112).” In other words, do the discourses of Health Canada 
representatives represent a take-off from normal science? 
I began my data analysis by reading the entire Senate transcripts in order to gain 
an understanding of the major topics, themes, and issues discussed. There are a lot of 
different perspectives on a wide variety of topics throughout the Senate inquiry.  
Therefore, I chose to focus on four specific issues characteristic of “post-normal” 
controversies; Mastitis, Canada’s dairy industry, regulatory environments and the future 
of Monsanto and industry in Canada, and rBST and Canada’s international 
competitiveness and trade. I then proceeded to isolate excerpts from the transcripts. 
Following this, I read the excerpts in order to gain a more in-depth look paying close 
attention to the three levels of discourse analysis, as described by Fairclough (1992). 
 Fairclough’s first level of discourse analysis is “Discourse as Text”. This level is 
primarily concerned with textual features (e.g. language use and language forms). In this 
level, Fairclough identifies four main aspects to consider when doing discourse analysis: 
vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure. 
Vocabulary examines words within a text and their meanings. A speaker is faced 
with many possible combinations of words to choose from when constructing his/her 
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statements. However, the words a speaker chooses is not arbitrary in that words are 
selected (consciously and unconsciously) to convey a certain image. As Fairclough 
(1992) asserts, the words a speaker uses are socially variable and socially contested as 
words and their meanings have wider social and cultural significance. Moreover, words 
are not static or one-dimensional. The meaning of a word can be highly variable, 
dependant upon its context, and subject to rapid change.  
In contrast grammar focuses upon how words are combined to form clauses and 
sentences. Fairclough (1992) divides grammar analysis into three dimensions: 
transitivity, theme, and modality.  Transitivity examines agency, causality, and the 
attribution of responsibility. Transitivity includes looking at whether sentences are active 
or passive. Nominalization, turning processes and activities into nouns, is a key to 
examining the omission of agents and participants.  
Other considerations include looking at what process types are dominant. Process 
types refer to how an actor represents social events. Fairclough (1992) states that the 
main process types in English include: action, event, relational, and mental. Action 
processes can be both direct (an agent is acting upon a goal) or indirect (there is an agent 
and an action; however there is no explicit goal). For example, the statement “the 
teacher scolded Paul” is an example of a direct action process type. Whereas the 
statement “the teacher was scolding” is an example of an indirect action process.  Event 
process types, by contrast involve an event and a goal. An example of an event process 
would be “Paul was scolded” Emphasis in event process types focus on explaining what 
happened. Relational process types are clauses representing relations of being and 
becoming or having possession. “Paul is scolded” is an example of a relational process 
type. Lastly, mental processes are representations of social events stressing states of 
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cognition such as “I think, I know, I feel”. The clause “Paul knows he deserved to be 
scolded” is an example of a mental process type.    
“Discursive practice” is the second level of Fairclough’s model. Discursive 
practice “draws upon conventions which naturalize power relations and ideologies and 
these conventions themselves and the ways in which they are articulated, are a focus of 
struggle” (Fairclough 1992: 71). This dimension involves examining how a text is 
produced, interpreted, and consumed. Fairclough calls attention to the socio-cognitive 
process of how a text is produced and interpreted. These socio-cognitive aspects include 
internalized social structures, norms and conventions and past experiences and events 
influencing how a text (any spoken or written utterance) is produced by an actor and 
how others may interpret a text (Fairclough 1992). Fairclough (1992) also emphasizes 
how text production and interpretation is constrained by the social context and social 
practices within which it is situated. Fairclough identifies intertexuality as the most 
significant feature to investigate in this dimension.  Basically, intertexuality refers to a 
text incorporating past texts. A text may incorporate other texts explicitly or implicitly 
for a variety of purposes such as integration, contradiction, and irony (Fairclough 1992). 
Fairclough’s “discourse representation” was an invaluable tool in my research.  
Discourse representation is a form of intertextuality in which a speaker is usually 
explicitly reporting on what others have said previously.  Fairclough divides discourse 
representation into two types: direct and indirect.  Direct representations use quotation 
marks (e.g. “she said “I am warning you””).  Indirect representations replace quotations 
by taking the represented discourse and making it a subordinate clause using ‘that’ to the 
reporting clause (e.g.  “She warned them that drinking and driving is dangerous”).  The 
choices a speaker makes when integrating other texts is important because these 
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instances reveal what a speaker declares as worthy, valid, and legitimate knowledge. 
Discourse representations are cues to the distance or affinity the speaker wishes to 
establish with other participants.  As Fairclough (1992: 107) explains “There is an 
explicit boundary between the ‘voice’ of the being reported and the ‘voice’ of the 
reporter and direct discourse is often said to use the exact words of the person being 
reported.”  With indirect representations, the voice of the reporter and the reported are 
less clear. As well, direct discourse representations stress the time and place of the 
original when the text was produced, whereas with indirect discourse representations a 
shift to the past tense occurs.                
Fairclough’s third dimension is ‘discourse as social practice’. This dimension 
focuses upon ideological and hegemonic properties and effects. The central tasks of 
analyzing this dimension are to provide explanations for how social and hegemonic 
relations and structures constitute discourses and how discourses transform social and 
hegemonic relations and structures.  
 
 
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four chapters.  In Chapter Two, I 
provide a broad analysis of the conventional and dominant approaches of the state with 
respect to risk issues. I begin with an introduction into the need for government action 
with new technologies and the appeals to science-based regulations to fulfill this need. I 
than proceed to review literature identifying problems with science in regulatory and 
policy matters. The second half of this chapter examines Canada’s regulatory confusion 
and conflict with Monsanto’s rBST submission. This chapter concludes with an 
overview of the uncertainty and high decision-stakes associated with making a 
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regulatory decision on rBST.  In Chapter Three, I elaborate on the post-normal 
environment surrounding rBST identified in Chapter Two, through an exclusive 
examination of how the features of post-normal science (uncertainty of facts, disputed 
values, high decision-stakes, and the need for a decision) were constructed and 
communicated in the Senate inquiry. In Chapter Four, I discuss my findings in terms of 
the inclusion/exclusion of extended facts and the encouragement of extended 
communities participating in a decision to accept or reject approval.  In Chapter Five, I 
conclude this thesis with a follow up of developments within Health Canada since the 
Senate inquiry. Conclusions drawn from this study are presented at the end of this 
chapter. 
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Chapter Two: Technology, Risk, and Regulation 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the past few decades there has been heightened public awareness and 
concern over risks. This heightened awareness has put new pressures on governments 
and industry to respond to risk issues with more transparency, precaution, and 
accountability. It is in this atmosphere that rBST entered Canada’s regulatory arena. The 
main purpose of this chapter is to provide a background into key events (both 
domestically and internationally) leading up to the Senate inquiry. The focus of this 
chapter is to identify the key social, economic, and political contexts directly related to 
rBST, as well as to identify pressures for change facing Canada’s regulatory institutions. 
This chapter is an exploration of the concept of risk and the dominant and alternative 
frameworks for its understanding and management.  I first explore the character of 
formal technical models and why they are so dominant in state regulatory activities. I 
then proceed to challenge the dominance of these models by exploring constructionist 
accounts of risk knowledge and the problems the state encounters using formal technical 
models to assess and subsequently manage risks.    
 
2.2 Technology and Risk 
Technology is a hallmark of modernity and promises to liberate humanity from 
nature by mastering it (Delanty 1999). Delanty (1999: 38) further notes that technology 
“was simply part of the grand narrative of progress and enlightenment.”  It is important, 
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that we make note of his use of the word “was.” Over the last four decades, the general 
public and some experts have been questioning the costs and benefits of technologies to 
our health, environment, lifestyle, and socio-economic well being. 
Recently, there has been a proliferation of discussion and concern over risks 
from experts and the public (Lupton 1999). Industrial development and technological 
innovations are two driving forces for this increased interest.  We are confronted with 
many different types of risks. There are risks to human health, to environmental 
sustainability, to our economic survival, and to our values and ethics. This marked 
interest is reflected in increased media attention and increased litigation and regulation 
(Nelkin 1984). Anthony Giddens termed this prominence of risk as “risk culture” 
Giddens (1991: 3-4) asserts: 
Modernity is a risk culture. I do not mean by this that social life is inherently 
more risky than it used to be; for most people that is not the case. Rather, the 
concept of risk becomes fundamental to the way both lay actors and technical 
specialists organize the social world. Modernity reduces the overall riskiness of 
certain areas and modes of life, yet at the same time introduces new risk 
parameters largely or completely unknown to previous areas. 
 
Originally risk was a neutral term indicating a wager between individuals after 
considering the chances of costs and benefits (Gabe 1995). Risk could therefore be 
defined simply as a probability of an event occurring. However, this basic definition 
does not really clarify what a risk is because there are many chance events not 
considered as a risk. According to Gabe (1995), the term risk almost always carries an 
image of negative or adverse consequences (Gabe 1995).  Thus, a more precise 
definition of risk could make exclusive reference to risk as a probability of a negative or 
adverse consequence.   
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These types of definitions do not capture the essence of what risk can mean. As 
Kemshall (2000) argues it is difficult to provide a concise, all encompassing, and 
universal definition of risk because every risk issue is diverse and far from uniform. 
Risks are dynamic social concepts and whether a risk is chosen or not, familiar or 
unfamiliar, or has devastating or minimal consequences as well as being what is 
impacted, and who benefits and who loses impacts how people respond to risks.     
 
2.3 The State and Science-based Regulations 
Citizens entrust their governments to assess and make decisions about risks on 
their behalf. The state is a central player in creating policies and enforcing regulations to 
protect the health and safety of citizens, protect the environment, and achieve economic 
growth and stability. Black (2002: 170) describes regulation as a “process involving the 
sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviors of others according to identified 
purposes with the intention of producing broadly identified outcome or outcomes which 
may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information gathering, and behavior 
modification.” Regulations exist out of some recognized need for protection, 
improvement, and/or stability. Jasanoff describes regulation as a contract requiring 
society and the state to agree to accept the costs, risks, and benefits of technologies 
(Jasanoff cited in Mills 2002: 12). Regulations are rift with controversies and conflict, 
especially when there are diverse interests, values, and meanings surrounding new 
technologies.  
Regulation involves losing certain freedoms such as the freedom to engage in 
particular behaviors, to consume certain products, or to sell and market a product. These 
costs of regulation are justified on the basis that the public needs to be safe and healthy. 
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Regulatory decisions are complex and difficult, with potentially far reaching impacts. 
There are serious consequences when regulatory agencies underestimate or misinterpret 
potential hazards. As well, there are political, economic, and social consequences 
accompanying regulatory choices.  For instance, imposing strict regulatory standards can 
stifle economic innovation and perhaps loss of the ability for Canadian markets to 
compete at the global level, and on the other side there is an overwhelming demand for 
precautionary measures to ensure safety and well-being.   
In order to balance the loss of freedoms, political demands and safety demands 
associated with regulation,  government agencies depend upon traditional or ‘normal 
science’ to inform policies and regulatory decisions . The state seeks legitimacy through 
science-based regulations (Doern and Reed 2001, Nelkin 1975, and De Marchi and 
Ravetz 1999). Science-based regulatory agencies, primarily and sometimes exclusively, 
rely on the natural sciences to make or at least justify regulatory actions (Jarvis 2001).   
Scientific knowledge is privileged knowledge because science claims to discover facts 
objectively, systematically, rigorously, and rationally. Basing decisions on science 
presumably leads to fair, effective, and efficient policy and regulatory choices. Science 
is embedded with the assumption that it will put an end to irrational and value-driven 
arguments.  
Science is also a powerful institution with prestige and status, setting standards 
and boundaries of what is and is not acceptable knowledge and practice. As 
Kloppenburg articulates: 
Despite the existence of many valid forms of knowledge, science has achieved 
the status of the modern epistemic hegemon, that standard against which all other 
knowledge claims are compared to (Kloppenburg 1992:98 cited in Beckie 2000). 
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The state enjoys a certain comfort level by justifying its decisions on technical 
grounds. In framing technology choices as a technical issue, the state can to a degree 
insulate itself from the rocky political terrain of values, beliefs, emotions, and 
ideologies. Science is presumed to discover irrefutable ‘hard’ facts’.  As Dorothy Nelkin 
(1975: 36) states: 
Science… is widely regarded as a means by which to de-politicize public issues. 
The increasing use of expertise is often associated with the ‘end of ideology’; 
politics, it is claimed, will become less important as scientists are able to define 
constraints and provide rational policy choices.  
 
Jasanoff (1995) notes that regulatory agencies are public and contentious by 
nature. Regulatory agencies are frequently accused of being incompetent or 
subordinating science to achieving political ends. In response to these two frequent 
charges, Jasanoff (1995) observes, regulatory agencies insist that autonomous and 
independent science will put their critics at ease. In an effort to appear credible and trust-
worthy, science-based regulatory agencies often seek to persuade their constituents that 
their decisions are entirely based upon theoretically sound, independent, 
methodologically rigorous, and objective science. This argument leaves science to 
scientists and political, economic, and social issues to be resolved elsewhere. Such 
separation of science and society is a dominant feature of science-based regulations.  
 
2.4 The Conventional Model of Regulating Risks and Managing Technology 
Scientific risk analyses are typically premised upon some variation of positivism. 
Mathematical calculations are utilized to predict the probability and severity of 
technological impacts. The use of mathematical calculations leads to the assumption that 
risks are manageable and can be brought within safe levels. Although risks are seen as 
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manageable this is qualified by the assertion that nothing can be guaranteed completely 
safe (Lidskog 1996).  Webler et al (1992) argue that the contention that risks are 
manageable, and nothing is guaranteed safe, restricts technical experts to bring the 
consequences within ‘safe’ levels and considerations such as who is at risk, the type of 
risk, and the social context in which exposure occurs becomes less relevant (Webler et al 
1992). 
Simplicity is a characteristic of normal science because it reduces complex 
phenomenon into discrete and manageable units for analysis. Normal science has 
difficulties in comprehending the totality of systems.  
 
2.5 Problems with and Alternatives to the Conventional Model 
According to Frewer (2001) it is not surprising or unusual that different 
stakeholders have different agendas when it comes to assessing and managing risks. 
Frewer (2001) expands this point to argue that failure to recognize or acknowledge the 
different agendas stakeholders bring to a risk issue will result in failure to achieve a 
consensus dialogue. Frewer (2001) cites a study by Scholderer et al (2000) in which 
consensus about risk analysis failed to emerge not because of technical disagreements 
but because individual members of stakeholder groups did not start discussions with 
similar representations of the nature of potential risks. For instance, scientists were 
concerned with risk estimate while members of civil society groups were concerned with 
technical limitations, voluntary exposure and consumer choice. As Frewer (2001: 223) 
articulates “Understanding how different groups represent objects and issues may assist 
our understanding of how institutions ‘learn’ to develop new forms of mediation and 
regulation in response to public concern about risks.”  
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The current alignment of the state and science in settling risk controversies is far 
from perfect. The relationship between science and politics is a delicate relationship. 
The state requires scientists to provide certainties and committed conclusions of which 
science is often unable to provide (Garvin 2001 and Mehta 2001). 
There are unique differences and challenges facing regulatory scientists making 
it imperative to examine how regulatory research is carried out. The challenges and 
uniqueness of regulatory science deserves special consideration because the rules that 
apply to normal science do not apply to the social, political, and economics impacts of 
any regulatory decision.  There are other unique features of scientific knowledge in 
regulatory decision-making. For instance, scientists work with material protected by 
commercial secrecy and the normal process of peer review- a characteristic of normal 
science- is hindered (Irwin et al 1997).  
In addition, there are ethical obligations, time limits, financial limitations and 
other methodological difficulties that scientists, in particular regulatory scientists, 
encounter while trying to achieve certainty in their findings. There are ethical guidelines 
preventing scientists from conducting certain experiments on humans, so they have to 
use lab animals. Extrapolating the results of experiments to the human population 
compromises the certainty of findings. To obtain certainty of the distributions and 
impacts of risks can require long periods of experimentation and testing. However, 
regulatory scientists often are not accorded such an opportunity for several reasons due 
to obligations to come to a decision within a certain time frame.  There may be limited 
studies thus limiting the ability to achieve absolute or near absolute certainty.  As well, 
financial resources compromise available labour, equipment, and other needs to increase 
certainty levels.  
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Committing to conclusions is difficult for scientists for several reasons. The 
epistemological and methodological foundations of science lead scientists to work in 
explicitly the realm of probabilities. Science has to continue to alter, if not challenge, 
existing scientific findings. With the evolving character of science what may be held as 
true today may not be so later on. Scientists working in regulatory agencies have 
tremendous responsibilities because their work can affect the health and safety of whole 
nations, and generations yet to come.  
Garvin (2001) sees a growth of interest in how knowledge and evidence is 
utilized. In particular, there is growing concern over how different actors construct and 
define usable knowledge in risk-based controversies. Conflicts can and do arise because 
of differences in how actors construct and define knowledge. Garvin (2001) argues that 
scientists, policy-makers, and the public use different language and unique discourses 
and conventions for constructing knowledge and persuasive arguments.  
Several commentators of the differences between public and expert 
understanding of risks have concentrated their efforts to examine differences between 
how expert and the lay public assess risks (e.g. Powell and Leiss 1997). Such differences 
include that experts typically deny the possibility that something is one hundred per cent 
safe.  The public demands “yes” and “no” answers. However, experts speak in 
probabilistic terms in which there are no certainties. Another noted difference is that 
experts look at population averages, whereas the public sees risks in terms of personal 
consequences.  Powell and Leiss (1997) also note that experts tend to view a death as a 
death, where as the public is concerned with how one dies. The public judges risk in 
terms of whether or not it is involuntary or voluntary.  Yet experts are generally not 
concerned with such issues or feel it is out of their domain as risk assessors (Jones 
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2001). These differences, Leiss and Powell (1997) argue are barriers to effective risk 
communication.   
There have been substantially different explanations proposed for how and why 
discrepancies exist between expert risk assessments and public assessments. There are 
two general positions within this literature. One position maintains that experts produce 
objective measures of risks while the public is treated as ignorant, misinformed, or 
irrational. This position generally maintains the idea that obstacles to risk reduction and 
risk elimination will be removed through educating and correcting the public. 
Trust is an essential component for achieving publicly acceptance about risks. 
Irwin and Wynne (1995) argue that in addition to rhetoric claims about the superiority of 
the scientific world view, science is also dependent upon building social processes of 
trust. To place trust in another individual or institution involves a willingness to put 
oneself in a vulnerable position. Trust is a complex concept with many dimensions. The 
dimensions of trust include perceptions of competence, objectivity, fairness, consistency, 
and values and interests of those who are to be trusted. These dimensions are not 
mutually exclusive and one feature may take prominence in how risk controversies are 
played out. For instance, objectivity may initially be a prerequisite for making a publicly 
acceptable decision. However, objectivity may become less relevant when individuals 
perceive their interests and values clashing with a particular decision reached. This 
heavy reliance upon technical expertise, especially by the state, has been labeled by 
some as anti-democratic (Freidson 1986). 
The sociology of scientific knowledge has provided much insight into social 
constructionist arguments of scientific knowledge. Although approaches are diverse, 
proponents of social constructionist theories share the common goal of challenging the 
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objective claims of science. Some commentators restrict values to only influencing the 
uses to which science is put while others argue that the very epistemological and 
methodological basis of science is value-laden and subjective. Several authors within the 
social constructionist school argue that science is no different than other types of 
knowledge and therefore should not be perceived as more valuable.  Science is often 
perceived as valuable and is often privileged in comparison to other forms of knowledge 
because of specific historical and cultural developments in western society (Garvin 
2001).  
Social constructionism essentially argues that finding the real objective measure 
of risks is an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task to the point where even the most 
ideal scientific study is biased and context dependent. This position sometimes takes the 
argument that scientific knowledge is limited and that new knowledge- and hence new 
solutions- needs to be integrated in risk management planning.   
Technical experts have assumptions about the social context of the risks they are 
investigating (Wynne 1989, Carter 1995). The social assumptions that guide expert risk 
assessments can result in different judgments about risks, even with the utilization of 
standard methods. Wynne (1989) argues that unearthing the social assumptions that 
guide technical risk assessment is an essential starting point for understanding the gaps 
that form between expert and public risk perceptions that are often irresolvable in a risk 
controversy.  
Given the identified problems with technical risk assessment, it is too simplistic 
and naïve to conclude that science is not needed for managing risks. Science is a 
persuasive force in our lives and we enjoy a certain comfort level in using science to 
assess risk levels and to remove scientific risk assessment from government policy and 
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regulatory standards would certainly be met with public opposition. I have taken the 
position that scientific risk assessment can be most useful and insightful, and rather than 
proposing to eliminate scientific risk assessment it should be enriched with other 
perceptions, knowledge, and experiences.      
 
2.5.1 Post-Normal Science 
 
Post-normal science developed in growing reaction to the changing policy and 
regulatory contexts in which science is situated. This changing context involves 
uncertainties, disputed values, high decision stakes, and urgent decisions (Ravetz 1999). 
A typical reaction is that such factors are not the concern of science but of politics. 
However, Ravetz (1999) argues that this position is problematic because science is 
thrown into resolving political disputes. Science is supposed to reduce complexities in 
order to make political decisions. However; complexity is increased as science is used as 
a strategic resource of political action (Von Schomberg 1995). Thus, scientists are 
placed in this research to be more than sources of objective facts. Scientists are also 
sources for political and economic manipulation. 
The biggest challenge to achieving post-normal science is that it runs against the 
dominant model of regulation in which the discovery of the “facts” will produce the best 
possible decision. Rather than entering into regulatory controversies in search of 
discovering which expert is more technically correct or more incorrect, post-normal 
science is about answering these two questions simultaneously: Who is more technically 
correct, and which expert evaluations are to be accepted for respecting values, 
communities, and economic and political interests?  
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Traditional science is about asking what/how and how/why questions. “What if” 
questions are typical in the very beginning of research before problems are defined and 
hypotheses are formed. By contrast, post-normal science takes the question “what if” as 
its leading question throughout all stages of inquiry.  
Post-normal science argues that value commitments and uncertainty are factors 
always present when decisions regarding risks are made. De Marchi and Ravetz (1999) 
argue that science must be complemented with other considerations. These scholars 
assert that even scientists themselves are requesting new information and other types of 
knowledge as they begin to realize the limitations of science for providing the necessary 
information for making the best policy or regulatory choices. 
Tierney (1999) argues that closer attention to the role of the state in the creation 
and allocation of risk is required. Tierney calls for a more critical examination of the 
state’s involvement in risk controversies because the state is more than a reducer or 
eliminator of risk. The state sometimes is either a passive bystander or a facilitator in the 
creation of risks and the unequal distribution of risks and benefits. The state, Tierney 
(1999) argues, should be viewed as an autonomous actor pursuing its own interests and 
creating hazards in the process. Tierney (1999) argues that sociologists need to pay 
greater attention to the states pivotal role in the political economy for promoting 
economic expansion and favourable conditions for business. 
Hegemony is a key theoretical concept of this research. Hegemony is 
conceptualized in this research as a privileging of one ideology over another. Ideology in 
this sense is understood to mean a “set of patterns or set of ideas, assumptions, beliefs, 
values, or interpretations of the world by which a culture or group operates” (Foss 1996: 
291). Foss (1996: 291) argues that ideologies are not always fully articulated or 
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apparent, such as “process is more important than product,” “competition produces 
superior achievements,” “men are more important than women,” and “the collective 
good is more important than the welfare of the individual.” These ideologies are 
sometimes constructed as superior and hence hegemonic.  
Antonio Gramsci argued that hegemonic ideologies are unstable and 
contradictions emerge. The unstable and contradictory properties of hegemonies allow 
for counter-hegemonies or alternative knowledge to challenge and resist oppressive 
power relations (Beckie 2000). The concept of hegemony is not restrictive in the sense 
that it allows for analysis of deviances within, and not just across, social groups such as 
the case of rBST where scientists depending on their personal beliefs, experiences, and 
position within Health Canada have differing value judgments. 
Hegemony is a pivotal concept to post-normal science because the authority of 
experts is increasingly challenged in science policy related fields (Ravetz 1999). Post-
normal science requires not only the trust of laypersons in regards to experts but also 
depends upon laypersons trusting experts to contribute to issues outside of their 
expertise.  
 
2.6 The Canadian Experience with rBST  
2.6.1 Profile of Monsanto and its rBST Product 
 On a global scale, the Monsanto Chemical Corporation is the second largest 
manufacturer of agricultural chemicals and one of the largest seed producers (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation 1999). Canadians had been introduced to the Monsanto 
Corporation before the rBST submission.  The Monsanto Corporation has had several 
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controversial products (e.g. PCB, Agent Orange, aspartame) compromising their 
credibility and trustworthiness internationally and in Canada. 
In the 1920s and 1930s French and Russian scientists experimented with 
extracting bovine somatotropin (BST) from the pituitary glands of slaughtered cattle and 
administered it to dairy cows. They discovered that administering extra BST into dairy 
cows increased milk production and extended lactation cycles. BST is a non-steroidal 
protein hormone found naturally in dairy cattle and is primarily responsible for 
regulating lactation and promoting growth. Naturally occurring BST is not viable as a 
production aid because it requires a large number of slaughtered cattle to produce a 
single dose. The development of recombinant DNA technology, however, allowed 
scientists to inexpensively mass produce synthetic BST known as recombinant bovine 
somatotropin (rBST).  In the 1980s several companies (Upjohn, Eli Lilly, Elanco, and 
Monsanto) developed recombinant bovine somatotropin products.   
Monsanto’s rBST product (Nutrilac) is at the center of this Canadian regulatory 
controversy even though there were several other rBST products reviewed by Health 
Canada. Elanco Canada submitted a new drug submission two years before Monsanto’s 
1990 submission. Monsanto became the leader in pushing for approval of rBST and 
Elanco Canada put their application on hold and waited for Monsanto’s regulatory 
outcome. This turned out to be a strategic decision for Elanco, as Monsanto’s Nutrilac 
application spent nine years under review, ultimately ending in a failure to receive a 
notice of compliance- the final hurdle in getting a pharmaceutical to market. 
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2.6.2 Health Canada and its Regulatory Mandates 
Health Canada is a science-based regulatory agency meaning that its decisions 
are justified on the basis of technical expert inputs and scientific experimentation. 
Canadians demand scientific assurances about the products they consume and have 
characteristically granted their regulatory agencies considerable power to act on their 
behalf. However, science-based regulatory regimes are increasingly under pressure to 
adapt to globalization, fiscal constraint, and diminished pubic confidence (Jarvis in 
Doern and Reed 2001). Canadian regulatory agencies assume the role of the exclusive 
protector of the public interest (Hoberg 1994 cited in Turner 2001a).  These agencies 
make decisions behind closed doors. These two defining features of Canada’s regulatory 
process are contingent upon high levels of public trust in Health Canada. There were 
several high profile controversies other than the rBST case threatening the level of trust 
needed to sustain Health Canada’s role of exclusive protector of public health and 
safety.  
Mills (2002) argues that Canada’s regulatory system is not conducive for 
scientists to challenge existing scientific knowledge or to broadly conceptualize health.  
Mills (2002) further explains that a combination of industry both creating data and 
paying for its evaluation, the creation of the Joint Management Advisory Committee (a 
committee composed of managers and industry representatives), time constraints, and 
regulators understanding of corporate requirements are pressures placing regulatory 
scientists in a difficult position.   
 In 1993-1994, the Canadian federal government initiated the Programme Review 
in an effort to cut costs by privatization, harmonization, and deregulation. The 
Programme Review also brought in a new market-based paradigm of risk regulation 
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(Turner 2001b).  Doern and Reed (2001) describe this market-based regulatory paradigm 
as one in which there is a greater reliance on industry’s scientific reviews and a 
decreased need for in-house science. Cost-recovery is emphasized and there is a greater 
emphasis on post-approval monitoring. Regulatory departments have had their budgets 
cut as well (Doern and Reed 2001). 
In these times of financial constraints and scientific uncertainty, government 
policy and regulatory agencies are demanding from science a more principled, efficient, 
and effective approach to risk assessment and management (Doern and Reed 2001). 
Canada’s drug approval system is one that has become heavily dependant upon science 
to provide the knowledge for decision-making.  
The federal government has made a commitment to foster the growth of 
biotechnology industries in Canada. This commitment is a subject of controversy as 
some argue that the government cannot regulate the risks of biotechnology and put the 
health and safety of Canadians at top priority while strategizing for biotech industry 
growth.  The Canadian government serves two contradictory roles: that of innovation 
promoter and regulator.  
The Bureau of Veterinary Drugs of Health Canada’s Health Protection Branch 
was responsible for evaluating and approving veterinary drugs such as rBST. The 
Bureau of Veterinary Drugs has two divisions within it: the Human Safety Division 
examines human health aspects of veterinary drugs and the Pharmaceutical Assessment 
Division reviews animal safety and efficacy aspects. The normal protocol for a new 
veterinary drug to be approved for sale and use in Canada involves the manufacturer 
submitting details of the drugs ingredients, manufacturing equipment, and methods. The 
manufacturer must also submit satisfactory scientific studies demonstrating their 
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products efficacy, stability, and safety for humans and animals. If the Bureau of 
Veterinary Drugs is unsatisfied, it can request the manufacturer to submit more studies. 
A notice of compliance may be issued once a product meets these requirements.  
rBST was one of the first major genetically engineered products introduced to 
Canada’s regulatory system. In many respects, Canadians perceived rBST as test case 
for the adequacy of Canada’s regulatory system to handle the predicted flood of 
genetically engineered products to come. As well, as one of the first genetically 
engineered products, rBST was arguably a test case for industry’s success in getting 
genetically engineered products on the market. Turner (2001b) suggests that Health 
Canada’s decision to ban rBST perhaps blunted Monsanto’s and other corporations’ 
commercial pursuit of biotechnologies. Whether or not this single case blunted corporate 
investments into biotechnologies is debatable, but nonetheless this case study 
demonstrates the explosion of this single drug into much larger questions of the state’s 
regulatory agencies and the political economy.  
The Canadian experience with rBST is one fraught with disagreement, 
controversy, and confusion.  The first controversy surrounding rBST occurred in 1989, 
when several local newspapers reported the milk from rBST test herds was added to the 
milk supply (Leiss and Powell 1997). According to Leiss and Powell (1997) even 
though Health Canada had cleared rBST treated milk for human consumption, the 
Canadian public objected.     
In March of 1994, concerns over rBST’s economic impacts on Canadian dairy 
farming prompted the House of Commons Standing Committee on Agriculture and 
Agri-Food to hold public hearings. This committee heard from Monsanto, dairy farmer 
groups, dairy industry representatives, and consumer groups. This committee 
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recommended further investigation into the costs and benefits of rBST for the Canadian 
dairy industry and greater transparency in the review process. However, the House of 
Commons committee hearings, according to Mills (2002), did not provide a clear 
resolution. Mills (2002) argued that socio-economic concerns officially remained 
outside of the regulatory review, the existing regulatory process was maintained, and 
that transparency was never accomplished.   
 The House of Commons inquiry established an rBST task force, comprised of 
representatives from Monsanto, Eli Lilly, the dairy industry, and the Canadian 
government (Mills 2002). The task force reviewed the socio-economic impacts on 
Canada’s dairy industry, consumer reactions, the impact on genetic evaluation programs, 
and consumer reactions in the United States (Turner 2001a). The task force 
recommended further scientific studies and investigation into rBST’s potential socio-
economic impacts. Consequently, a one-year moratorium on rBST was initiated. The 
overall result of this task force, according to Turner (2001a) was a favourable 
assessment for approval, and a setback for anti-rBST groups.  
Several commentators have addressed how rBST is a struggle over defining what 
is “natural”. Proponents of rBST who took on the route to persuade others that rBST is 
identical - or at the very least very similar - to BST essentially did so to persuade others 
that rBST is natural and therefore must be safe. Similarly, some proponents of rBST also 
presented the argument that rBST is simply a tool to enhance nature. Turner (2001b) 
notes the struggle to define rBST as natural or conversely unnatural emerged in 
American science in the early 1990s.    
In November 1998, Health Canada established two independent expert advisory 
panels. Health Canada established these panels in order to break the scientific deadlock 
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on rBST within the department. The regulatory decision became contingent upon the 
conclusions of these two expert panels. One panel, operating under the Royal College of 
Physicians and Surgeons, examined human health issues with rBST. The other panel, 
established by the Canadian Veterinary Medical Association, examined animal health 
and safety aspects of rBST.  
In the face of tensions surrounding rBST, the Standing Senate Committee of 
Agriculture and Forestry began a public inquiry into rBST on 4 June 1998. Credibility 
and responsibility issues of Health Canada, as well as persistent scientific uncertainty 
and economic concerns, were the topics of most interest. Discussion and debate 
regarding risk analysis, public participation, the precautionary principle, and the 
influence of international regulatory bodies also took place within the Senate inquiry 
(Turner 2001b). 
 
2.6.3 Human Health and rBST Milk 
The impacts of consuming milk from rBST treated cows on human health and 
safety is one of the top concerns with this product. To question the safety of rBST milk 
was to question the safety and goodness of natural non-rBST treated milk, a food that 
symbolizes what is natural, nutritious, and wholesome. In an effort to persuade critics of 
rBST’s safety, proponents of this drug stressed the similarity of rBST and BST.  This 
debate often centered on comparing the amino acid composition of each.  Monsanto’s 
Nutrilac differs by one amino acid in a chain of 191 in comparison with BST (Jones 
2001). Only Upjohn’s rBST product is considered identical to BST (Mills 2002).     
Monsanto argued that because rBST is a protein it will be digested and 
impossible for rBST to enter the human blood stream where residues could cause harm. 
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This assumption, Jones (1999) speculates is the reason why Man Sen Yong, the Chief of 
the Human Safety Division, gave rBST human safety clearance in 1990.  
Health Canada again declared rBST safe for humans in 1995 by issuing an 
Experimental Studies Certificate. Further, human safety confirmations included United 
States Food and Drug Administration approval for Monsanto’s rBST product (U.S trade 
name Posilac) in 1993.  As well, on 5 March 1998, The Joint Expert Committee on Food 
Additives (JECFA) found that rBST presented no human health concerns with rBST 
(Jones 2001). The significance of this is that JECFA advises the Codex Alimentarius 
Committee, a U.N. agency of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) which sets international food safety standards, and 
whose judgments are used to settle what might be discriminatory trade practices when a 
country refuses to import a product for human health reasons.   
However, human safety concerns persisted inside Health Canada. Scientists 
within the Human Safety Division dissented from Health Canada’s earlier declaration of 
rBST’s safety. These scientists requested the establishment of an internal review team to 
re-examine human safety data and to locate procedural and scientific gaps in the 
literature (Turner 2001b). Management agreed and established the “gaps analysis team.” 
The gaps analysis team consisted of four scientists from the Bureau’s Human Safety 
Division, a scientist from the Therapeutic Products Division, and another scientist from 
the Chemical Health Hazard Assessment Division (Mills 2002). 
The ‘gaps analysis’ team was divided as the two non- Bureau of Veterinary 
Drugs scientists felt the other members were too concerned with internal conflicts. 
However, the team did report two deficiencies in the scientific literature. The gaps 
analysis team discovered that when looking at the raw data of Monsanto’s 90-day rat 
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study, a study submitted as evidence for rBST’s safety, that 20-30% of the rats 
developed antibodies to rBST, a feature not mentioned in Monsanto’s summary (Jones 
2001). The presence of rBST in the digestive tract of rats was another deficiency 
uncovered. 
Insulin-like growth factor (IGF-1), a byproduct of lactation found in milk 
emerged as a major human health concern among the scientific community. Both 
administered rBST and a cow's own BST produce IGF-1. However, in the mid 1990’s 
scientists studied IGF-1 and implicated IGF-1 with tumors growth and certain types of 
cancer.   
According to Mills (2002) there was little disagreement among scientists that the 
existing scientific evidence proved rBST milk is unsafe for human consumption. 
However, the scientific community was divided over the need for more research and the 
discrepancies between scientists' expectations and the need for further investigation 
(Mills 2002).   
 
2.6.4 Animal Health and Safety  
 The Bureau of Veterinary Drugs is required to demonstrate that a new veterinary 
drug is safe for treated animals under the Food and Drug Act. There is several animal 
health issues associated with rBST. These include mastitis, reproductive problems, 
culling, and lameness.  As well, the implications of animal health problems were 
addressed in terms of its direct and indirect affects on human health.  
 In 1990, six months after receiving Monsanto’s Nutrilac submission, evaluators 
within the Pharmaceutical Assessment Division declared the submission incomplete for 
animal health (Turner 2001b).   
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 Although human health issues received greater attention and debate than animal 
health risks, it was animal health reasons citied as the reason to reject a notice of 
compliance. The animal safety expert panel reported a 25% increase in clinical mastitis, 
an increased risk of non-pregnancy, a 50% increased risk of lameness, and a 20-25% 
increase in culling (Turner 2001b). 
 
2.6.5 Canada’s Dairy Industry 
 In 1970 the Canadian Milk Supply Management system was established. The 
supply management system works to protect against oversupply through quotas. Farmers 
must buy or sell quotas.  The quota is a contract of how much product the farmer will 
deliver. Supply management ensures that supply meets demand. The supply 
management system also restricts imports in order to protect Canada’s dairy industry 
from international competition.  Up until 1995, import restrictions were accomplished 
through imposing import quotas on dairy products. However, in 1993 Canada signed a 
World Trade Agreement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
that no longer permitted import quotas (Boyd 1999). Import quotas were consequently 
replaced by tariffs. Tariffs were supposed to be reduced and eliminated with NAFTA, 
however, in July 1996 a trade panel ruled in favour of Canada to maintain high tariffs 
(Mills 2002).  
 Over the past three decades, the demographics of Canada’s dairy farms have 
changed. In 1971, there were approximately 145,000 dairy farms (Boyd 1999). In 1983, 
the number of dairy farms was 49, 936 (Canadian Dairy Industry Profile, Agriculture 
and Agri-Food Canada 2004). By 1996, there were a reported 30,900 dairy farms (Boyd 
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1999).  In 2003, the number or farms decreased further to 17, 931(Canadian Dairy 
Industry Profile, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 2004).  
 Although the number of farms has substantially decreased, the average size of a 
dairy farm increased.  In 1996, the average number of cows per dairy farm was 35 and in 
2002, the average size was 60, a change of 71 per cent (Canadian Dairy Industry Profile, 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 2004).    
 Over the last three decades, there has been a decline in the overall number of 
cows in Canada.  In 1971 Canada had approximately 2.3 million dairy cows (Boyd 
1999). In 1983 there were approximately 1.7 million dairy cows (Canadian Dairy 
Industry Profile, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 2004).  In 1996, the number 
dropped to 1.2 million (Boyd 1999). The latest available data from 2003 reports just 
over a million dairy cows.    
Despite fewer cows in Canada, milk production has continued to climb, both in 
terms of volume of milk produced per farm and overall. In 1983, the total volume of 
milk produced in Canada was at 72.3 million hectoliters and in 2003 the total volume of 
milk produced was at 74.5 million hectoliters (Canadian Dairy Industry Profile, 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 2004).  
 
 
2.6.6 Scandal, Conspiracy, Cover-up: Health Canada and its Relationship 
with Industry 
 
Health Canada’s handling of rBST is dramatic with allegations of corruption, 
scandal, and cover-up.  Beginning in 1997, Health Canada was finding itself immersed 
in a public confidence crisis over rBST. Over the next two years a spotlight was cast 
intermittently on the internal problems and credibility and accountability lapses within 
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Health Canada. Rank-and-file scientists within the Bureau of Veterinary Drugs came 
forward with damaging allegations of cover-ups, intimidation, and scandal within the 
ranks of Health Canada management. They told stories of management putting pressure 
on them to approve drugs, rBST included, despite lingering doubts of their safety. 
Internal conflict between managers and employees also included high turn over rates and 
accounts of racism (Turner 2001b).  
 Further damaging and scandalous allegations followed. Margaret Haydon, a 
support scientist for review of rBST within the Bureau of Veterinary Drugs, alleged that 
rBST documents were stolen from her locked cabinet. She also told about Monsanto 
attempting to bribe her with $1 million in research funding. Top health officials were 
also accused of trying to suppress a report criticizing Health Canada’s handling of rBST 
(Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 1999). 
 
2.7 Summary 
In this chapter, I provided a brief review of the social scientific literature on risk, 
technology, and regulation. I described the dominant model of risk regulation in which 
decisions must be justified with science and political, economic, and social issues, if 
they are addressed; they are addressed separately from science. However, there are 
several compelling arguments that scientific knowledge embodies many assumptions 
and values of the social context in which risks exist. Upon reviewing this general 
literature, it became apparent that there is a need and a demand for alternative models 
for regulating risks. Post-normal science is one alternative that I focused upon in this 
chapter. Post-normal science maintains that science is important but that science can be 
 36
improved through increased participation of a variety of experts and laypersons and 
embracing other types of knowledge.   
In the second part of this chapter, I described rBST, Monsanto, and Health 
Canada’s responsibility. I provided a history of rBST in Canada and the controversies 
that accumulated throughout the nine years it took to make a decision.  I also examined 
the financial restraints and restructuring of Health Canada that has made science-based 
decisions even more problematic and controversial.   
I also provided a background of the structure of the Canadian dairy industry and 
its transformation towards industrialization and intensification. The Canadian dairy 
industry has been through profound transformations because of science and technology.  
Cows are producing significantly more and there is a surplus of milk. Social and 
economic changes have occurred as a result of science and technology. The trend is 
towards fewer but larger dairy farms and family farms are struggling to exist.     
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Chapter Three: Post-normal Science and the Senate Inquiry 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed the literature on the dominance of normal 
science in regulatory matters and reviewed the challenges of this traditional science in 
regulatory decision-making. I then provided a background on rBST in Canada to 
uncover the complexities and points of contention leading up to the Senate inquiry. 
 In this chapter, I examine the contents of the Senate inquiry with an in-depth 
look at how the uncertainty of facts, disputed values, high decision stakes, and the 
urgency/need for a decision were presented, constructed and negotiated. More 
specifically, I examine how mastitis, an infection of the udder in cows, was addressed by 
participants in the Senate inquiry to represent the uncertainty of facts aspect of this post-
normal regulatory situation. Secondly, I examine how consumer reactions to rBST, and 
biotechnology in general, emerged as a dispute over defining health, safety, and benefits. 
I examine the different values witnesses and Senators placed on consumer reactions and 
the option of labeling rBST treated milk. Thirdly, I investigate discussions around 
proprietary information and confidentiality of manufacturer’s data and the problems of 
this policy in terms of public participation and consultation. This section includes a 
presentation of what is at stake if the drug approval process releases information to the 
public and the larger scientific community.  In the last section, I provide insights into the 
ways witnesses and Senators discussed and debated the urgency and/or need for a 
 38
decision because of Canada’s trade agreements and the need for economic development 
through scientific and technological innovations. 
 
3.2 Mastitis 
Throughout the Senate committee considerable discussion was devoted to the 
certainty and uncertainty of scientific studies on rBST’s safety for both humans and 
animals. There was a variety of experts testifying at the Senate inquiry providing an 
opportunity to examine the presentation of scientific evidence and subsequently, how 
both laypersons and experts evaluated such information.  I begin this chapter with an 
exploration of how mastitis was addressed in the Senate inquiry. Mastitis was a concern 
for many participants because of the potential economic loses of this disease for farmers.  
As well, witnesses and Senators placed different significance and priority on this issue 
because of the indirect human health risks associated with increased antibiotic use.  
 
3.2.1 Does rBST Cause Mastitis? 
 
A difficult fact on mastitis is that this condition occurs because of increased milk 
production with or without the use of rBST. Participants agreed that increased milk 
production increases the risk of cows developing mastitis. Participants also agreed that 
rBST increases milk production in dairy cows. However, participants disagreed that 
rBST could be directly implicated with increased incidences of mastitis as some argued 
that herd management skills determine mastitis outbreaks.  
We have not uncovered anything unusual in our product that does not normally 
occur in any kind of dairy herd. Everything occurs with the same incidence in 
cows not supplemented with BST. We receive almost no reports or complaints of 
Posilac being associated with an increase of something like mastitis, which is 
probably of most concern to dairy farmers. That has an impact on milk 
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production (David Kowalczyk, Director, Regulatory Affairs, Monsanto, Senate 
of Canada 1998a). 
 
But rBST does not give the cow mastitis. Higher levels of milk production 
require higher levels of food, as Senator Whelan said (Senator Hays speaking to 
Shiv Chopra, Bureau of Veterinary Drugs evaluator and gaps analysis team 
member, Senate of Canada 1998b). 
 
The size of the herd would not necessarily make a difference to how you would 
manage mastitis, because it comes down to keeping your cows clean and your 
equipment in good working order to try to lower somatic cells so that your cows 
do not get mastitis. That is no different for a herd of 28 or 280 or 1,200 cows. A 
larger herd versus a smaller herd would not make that much difference (Linnea 
Kooistra, Dairy Farmer from Illinois that uses rBST, Senate of Canada 1998g). 
 
Several witnesses stated that Monsanto’s own data indicates there is an increased 
risk of mastitis.    
Turning to the mastitis and the increased use of antibiotics, even the Monsanto 
label warns about all the things that can go wrong with cows using their product 
(Senator Spivak, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
Monsanto reported results from eight trials, which the company interpreted as 
demonstrating that the use of rBST caused no significant increase in mastitis. 
Sussex University subsequently found out there was an increase of 19 per cent. A 
later publication from Monsanto covering 15 trials claimed there was still no 
adverse effect on clinical mastitis or on somatic cell count, whilst the analysis 
undertaken by Millstone at Sussex University in the U.K. showed that within the 
15 trials the use of rBST increased the incidence of clinical mastitis by 
approximately 39 per cent. This was using figures they obtained from Monsanto 
(John Verrall, The Food Ethics Council, Senate of Canada 1998e).  
 
If you look at the situation where there might be a greater incidence of mastitis in 
cows treated with the hormone, Monsanto's people used a set of data that said 
there was no difference. They gave this raw data to a group of people working in 
England who looked at the statistics and said that there is a significant increase in 
the incidence of mastitis in the treated cows (Ann Oaks, Fellow of the Royal 
Society of Canada, Senate of Canada 1998e).  
 
Studies other than Monsanto’s were also mentioned  
 
The moratorium is being imposed because, as the report says, they are concerned 
with: 1) increased levels of a hormone called IGF-1 in milk; and 2) increased 
disease rates in treated cows that lead to increased antibiotic use (Senator 
Chalifoux discussing the European’s Moratorium on rBST with Mr. Collier of 
Monsanto Senate of Canada 1998a).  
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Monsanto reported results from eight trials which the company interpreted as 
demonstrating that the use of rBST caused no significant increase in mastitis. 
Sussex University have subsequently found that there was an increase of 19 per 
cent (Senator Taylor, Senate of Canada 1998e). 
 
Margaret Haydon stated that the scientific studies on mastitis that she had 
reviewed from three different companies - before have been taken off the file in 1994 -
were methodologically flawed. She argued that she could not say in a statistically 
significant manner that mastitis was a concern.  However, she did argue that from her 
past large animal practice experience, she considered mastitis to be a significant 
concern. 
But at that time there were problems with -- as I say, there were three different 
companies' data that I reviewed -- there were problems with design of studies and 
this sort of thing, so there were even some studies that I did not receive specific 
information about how much mastitis had even occurred. Those cows would just 
disappear from the study, and there was no further explanation or follow-up. In 
other cases, I sometimes did not even find out what particular bacterial organism 
or mastitis organism was causing the problem because that work was not 
provided. So there were all sorts of variations in the amount of data that was 
supplied, but there certainly appeared to be an increase. I could not say from a 
statistically significant point of view, because sometimes there were not enough 
cows in which to determine that; sometimes there were not enough data provided 
(Margaret Haydon, Bureau of Veterinary Drugs evaluator and gaps analysis team 
member, Senate of Canada 1998b).  
 
3.2.2 Antibiotic Residues: A Manageable Human Health Concern 
Mastitis was implicated as a human health threat because of increased antibiotic 
use in dairy cattle to treat this disease. Increased antibiotic residues in milk were a 
human health concern that several participants addressed. There was no scientific 
consensus on elevated antibiotic residues in milk associated with rBST.  Michael Hansen 
from the Consumer Policy Institute disagreed with JECFA’s finding that there were no 
insignificant changes with antibiotic residue levels after rBST was approved. He cited 
 41
flawed experimental design, misinterpretations, and inaccurate reporting as the reasons 
for this disagreement. Dr. Chopra and Dr. Paterson had different conclusions about the 
quality of the FDA’s post-approval monitoring study of rBST.  
Not the way it is being done in the United States right now where there is this 
study where you give to whatever cows you want to and then you pool the milk 
and then you look for antibiotic residues and IGF in there. How are you going to 
determine that? There is no way to have scientific information coming out of that 
and say everything is all right (Shiv Chopra, Bureau of Veterinary Drugs 
evaluator and gaps analysis team member, Senate of Canada 1998b).  
 
An important part of our review has been the decision by the U.S. to approve 
rBST and, as part of that decision, the requirement for post-approval monitoring 
which occurred from 1994 to 1996. In that, the FDA requested that Monsanto 
proactively develop an adverse drug experience reporting system, do statistically 
valid analyses of state antibiotic drug residue data, and do a health evaluation of 
28 commercial herds representative of the U.S. dairy industry (George Paterson, 
Director General, Foods Directorate Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998a). 
 
 
3.2.3 Antibiotic Resistance: A Not-so Manageable Human Health Concern 
 
Antibiotic residues in the milk supply were a concern, although some 
participants argued that antibiotic resistance was a much bigger threat. Monsanto 
representatives and Health Canada managers presented that antibiotic residue was the 
primary human health concerns with mastitis while Senators, several witnesses, and 
Health Canada evaluators argued that antibiotic resistance was a much larger and serious 
threat. Shiv Chopra had very different descriptions of the antibiotic resistance problem 
from those of Margaret Haydon, David Dodge, and Dr. Losos.  Dr. Chopra’s testimony 
gave a sense of urgency to this problem because he argued that this is a current problem 
whereas the others presented antibiotic resistance as a potential problem. Dr. Chopra 
used the pronoun “you” to emphasize to his audience that this is a problem that directly 
affects them. Margaret Haydon, much like David Dodge and Joseph Losos, described 
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antibiotic resistance with formal language. Margaret Haydon did claim personal 
ownership of the antibiotic resistance problem.   
The study also says that mastitis in treated cows increases antibiotic use. I am 
very concerned with this issue. It affects our own health, because it makes us 
more resistant to antibiotics, and we know that antibiotics are carried through to 
the milk and the meat (Senator Chalifoux speaking to Mr. Collier, Senate of 
Canada 1998a). 
 
…and there are issues of antibiotic resistance, which have a direct effect coming 
out of overproduction of milk, causing mastitis; overuse of antibiotics, causing 
antibiotic resistance. Fifty per cent of the antibiotics are used -- all antibiotics are 
used in animals and farm animals, so the spillover effect of that is directly on the 
humans, because antibiotic resistance is now killing people because you do not 
have antibiotics to cure people. You go to hospital to get your appendix out, and 
you pick up an infection and you die because it cannot be treated anymore (Shiv 
Chopra, Bureau of Veterinary Drugs evaluator and gaps analysis team member, 
Senate of Canada 1998b).  
 
This is an issue where the whole world is clamouring with fear. Antibiotic 
resistance is emerging from food-producing animals and affecting human health. 
People are dying when they go to hospitals because they pick up infections. It is 
coming from the sub-therapeutic use of antibiotics on the farms (Shiv Chopra, 
Bureau of Veterinary Drugs evaluator and gaps analysis team member, Senate of 
Canada 1999c). 
 
It is not a question of residues any more; it is a question of additional use of 
antibiotics, which poses a danger (Shiv Chopra, Bureau of Veterinary Drugs 
evaluator and gaps analysis team member, Senate of Canada 1999a). 
 
Of course, my concern is the potential for the increased use of antibiotics 
promoting increased resistance in the on-farm bacteria. These can have potential 
human safety effects in the sense that the organisms on the farm may acquire that 
resistance, as well as the organisms that humans have. There is a transmission of 
resistance between bacteria (Margaret Haydon, Bureau of Veterinary Drugs 
evaluator and gaps analysis team member, Senate of Canada 1998b). 
 
This is a very serious problem. It is a classic issue where third parties are 
affected and where, over time, we could have some serious public health risks 
through overuse of antibiotics both for animals and for humans. We are working 
hard on this (David Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 
1999c).   
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3.2.4 Approval Criteria and Action Plans 
The following are participant’s accounts of what scientists and regulators should 
consider in regards to rBST and mastitis, antibiotic residues and antibiotic resistance.   
With regard to our efficacy review, through research trials and commercial use it 
must be shown that rBST will result in increased production as measured by the 
increased weight of milk produced. That milk must be marketable, and the milk 
from cows treated with antibiotics cannot be sold until the residues of the drugs 
have dropped to established safe levels. Those are the three main criteria of our 
efficacy review (George Paterson, Director General, Foods Directorate Health 
Canada, Senate of Canada 1998a). 
 
Mastitis would be considered in terms of cow health and welfare, but also with 
regard to using antibiotics, and the antibiotic residues getting into milk (George 
Paterson, Director General, Foods Directorate Health Canada, Senate of Canada 
1998a).  
 
We will be looking at that and trying to determine our best estimate to whether 
there is an increased risk of mastitis associated with the product. If so, how big 
an increased risk is it? Is it something of substantial consequence that we need to 
be concerned about, or is it very small? We will also be addressing that question. 
I am afraid that I cannot tell you the answers to those questions yet (Ian Dohoo, 
Chair of the Animal Safety Panel, Senate of Canada 19988d). 
 
The first issue that was of concern was mastitis. JECFA only looks at safety in 
food, and so the only concern that fell within its purview was that of antibiotic 
residues, and, to all intents and purposes, there was no increase in antibiotic 
residues (Jock McLean, Dean of Faculty of Applied Science and Pro Vice 
Chancellor, Division of Science, Swinburne University of Technology, and 
former JECFA advisor, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
Monsanto witnesses, dairy representatives, and Ian Dohoo from the animal safety 
expert panel dismissed antibiotic residues getting into the milk supply as a problem 
because of the stringent testing procedures to control for antibiotic residue levels in 
milk, mandatory withdrawal times, and fines if a farmer’s milk has antibiotic levels 
above an established maximum.   
There was also some discussion this morning about antibiotic residues. I can 
assure you that every load of milk in Canada is tested for residues. It is not just a 
Mickey Mouse test. The milk is broadly screened for a wide range of antibiotics, 
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and the penalties are severe. There is no risk to the milk supply in this country 
(Robert Bell, Monsanto witness and veterinarian, Senate of Canada 1998g).  
 
Antibiotics are checked on every load. When a tanker load arrives at the dairy, 
there is a check on the full tanker load. If that tanker is found to contain an 
unacceptable antibiotic level, then that tanker is disposed of. They then go to the 
particular vials that made up that load. That producer is then found. He is 
responsible for the full tanker load of milk. I am talking about $17,000 or 
$18,000 for one tanker load. He does not get paid for his milk, plus he is 
responsible for everyone else's milk on that truck. That is quite an incentive to 
ensure that that does not happen. That is done on every load in this country 
(Baron Blois, President of the Dairy Farmers of Canada, Senate of Canada 
1998d). 
 
There are serious consequences for producers who let antibiotic residues enter 
into the food chain now. In addition to the penalties associated with being 
detected, if the truckload of milk is found to have residues, they must pay for the 
whole truckload (Ian Dohoo, Senate of Canada 1998c). 
 
Health Canada management did not offer any specifics about what would be 
considered with regards to the antibiotic resistance issue.  Mr. Dodge invited Senator 
Spivak to attend a stakeholder meeting on antibiotics and the food supply.  Dr. Losos, 
the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Health Protection Branch, referred to the 
importance of surveillance programs and the resources of private industry.  
We have a two-pronged program in the Health Protection Branch, one with the 
foods program looking at feeds. We are working with the European Union and 
the Americans and with other countries who are equally concerned. We know 
that the incidence of antibiotic resistance is intolerable. The second important 
stream is antibiotic resistance in humans in hospitals, post-surgery, in intensive 
care and elsewhere. We have intensive surveillance programs across the country 
with a number of professional associations. Private industry cannot put enough 
resources into research for new antibiotics. We know this is an important area 
and we are giving it priority (Joseph Losos, Assistant Deputy Minister of the 
Health Protection Branch, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1999d). 
 
Michael Hansen, a research associate from The Consumers Union, argued that effort is 
needed to stop the growth of antibiotic resistance. 
Therefore, while I do agree that the amount of antibiotics that will be in the milk 
will be marginal compared to the overuse that is occurring in human and animal 
medicine, part of the way to control antibiotic resistance is through thousands of 
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small increments, from doctors exercising restraint in prescribing antibiotics for 
respiratory ailments, to reductions of the animal feed uses. Since the only 
purpose of rBGH is to increase milk outputs, and since there is no therapeutic 
use, we do not think we should tolerate any increase in antibiotic use whatsoever 
through this drug. That will be a very small step. The antibiotic resistance issue 
is one to which rBGH will contribute, however small that contribution may be, 
and that must be stopped (Michael Hansen, Consumer Policy Institute of the 
Consumers Union, Senate of Canada 1999a). 
 
 
3.2.5 Decisions and Uncertainty 
 
The following passage from David Dodge the Deputy Minister of Health Canada 
is significant because he framed the willingness to accept the risks of uncertainty as a 
“judgment call”, presupposing the existence of choice. The significance of which is that 
he is recognizing post-normal insights that “we must make hard policy decisions where 
our scientific inputs are irremediably soft” (Ravetz 1999: 649). 
That is the evolution of science and knowledge over time. We are always 
working with a degree of uncertainty. The difficult job -- such as you had when 
you were Minister of Agriculture or such as Mr. Rock has as Minister of Health 
today -- is to weigh the benefits of proceeding even though things are not 
absolutely certain. Things will never be certain, but we weigh the benefits of 
proceeding against the potential costs and risks. That is a very difficult job. In the 
end, that cannot be delegated. It is a difficult judgment call (David Dodge, 
Deputy Minister, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1999d).  
 
There were no witnesses arguing that it is possible to assess the health and safety risks 
with absolute certainty. Several participants noted that decisions must be made with 
some uncertainty.   
When a submission is at stake, the decision to approve or not approve the 
product must be taken at some point. It is not uncommon for regulatory agencies 
to have to make such decisions in the face of some uncertainty (Thea Mueller, 
Bureau of Pharmaceutical Assessment, Therapeutic Products Directorate 
evaluator and gaps analysis team member, Bureau of Pharmaceutical 
Assessment, Therapeutic Products Directorate evaluator and gaps analysis team 
member, Senate of Canada 1998b). 
 
Senator Whelan said earlier that it is hard to prove that something does not 
happen. That is true. However, that is the basis of the scientific method. This sort 
 46
of uncertainty is what scientists deal with all the time…. We are always dealing 
with probabilities. We will never prove with 100 per cent certainty that rBST, or 
some of the other biological substances that result from the use of rBST, are 
absolutely safe. It cannot be done. If that is the standard that we have to achieve, 
there is no point in starting. We must deal with what science always deals with: 
probabilities. That is certainly what the human safety panel will do (Stuart 
McLeod, Human Safety Panel, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
When we come to the issue of safety, nothing is absolutely guaranteed under any 
circumstances. If we wanted to aim for absolute safety, then we would spend all 
of our budget ensuring that, and there would be nothing left for the important 
issues. Absolute safety is not achievable. The safety levels that are associated 
with treatment with BST do not warrant our going any further in trying to ensure 
safety there, but rather putting resources into other areas (Jock McLean, Dean of 
Faculty of Applied Science and Pro Vice Chancellor, Division of Science, 
Swinburne University of Technology, and former JECFA advisor, Senate of 
Canada 1998d).  
 
3.3 Consumers, the Dairy Industry, and the Drug Approval Process 
In this section, I examine the contributions of dairy producers and processors, 
Monsanto representatives, Senators, citizen groups’ representatives, and Health Canada 
officials in regard to the rights of consumers and farmers to decide the fate of this 
product. The purpose of this discussion is to illustrate further the diversity of values and 
interests in rBST.  I then proceed to examine testimony concerned with whether or not 
these socio-economic issues have a place in Health Canada’s decision-making. I argue 
that there is an overwhelming tendency to try and keep science separate from these other 
concerns; however, the socio-economics and political factors of rBST were not always 
separable from the science of health and safety.  
 
3.3.1 Consumer Trust and the Dairy Industry 
Dairy farmers and dairy processors expressed considerable concerns over rBST 
and consumer reactions on the dairy industry.  Dairy representatives argued that 
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consumer confidence in the wholesomeness and purity of milk must be maintained.  
They argued negative consumer reactions will hurt them financially. In addition to the 
economic consequences, dairy farmer and dairy processor witnesses also argued that 
they owe their consumers the best possible product out of a sense of pride and 
obligation.   
Our livelihood depends on their confidence in dairy foods as nutritious, 
wholesome, tasty, and, most of all, safe (Tim Finkle, vice-president of the 
National Dairy Council of Canada, Senate of Canada 1998c).  
  
These latter campaigns generated in excess of several thousand complaints. In 
the history of the National Dairy Council of Canada, founded 80 years ago, we 
have no record of any similar crisis of such magnitude. If a consumer has taken 
the time to write, fax or call us and our member companies, we must respond to 
them. We cannot afford to dismiss so many complaints (Tim Finkle, vice-
president of the National Dairy Council of Canada, Senate of Canada 1998c).  
 
It would be crazy, and it would be silly economics, to spend millions of dollars 
promoting the product on the one hand, and lose consumer confidence on the 
other. We have said all along that the approval process for this product must be 
seen by the public to be very credible (Baron Blois, President, Dairy Farmers of 
Canada, Senate of Canada 1998c).  
 
It is true that the studies from the petitioner say otherwise, but other studies do 
not really demonstrate the cost effectiveness. This is not our major concern. Our 
major concern is how the consumer will react to all of this? Our client is the 
consumer. For the petitioner, the client is the milk producer. The petitioner is 
very little concerned with the rest of the chain. Even if Health Canada approves 
the hormone, we do not yet know how we will react. We hope that Health 
Canada will have a credible process and will do its job in reassuring the public 
sufficiently to dispense with labeling (Lise Beauchamp, agriculture specialist, a 
dairy producer from Quebec, and a board member on the Dairy Farmers of 
Canada, Senate of Canada 1998c). 
 
We have become even more aware of the massive resistance to this product 
among Canadian farmers and consumers from coast to coast, and of the 
incontestable scientific, economic and humanitarian reasons for that resistance 
(Peter Dowling, Member of the National Farmers Union National Executive and 
a Dairy Farmer, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
George Paterson, Director General of the Foods Directorate at Health Canada 
indicated a drop in milk consumption was not anticipated with the introduction of rBST: 
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Milk consumption is not part of our review per se, but I will give you some 
information on it which was gathered in the U.S. before and after the approval of 
rBST. Basically, it shows that before approval 15 to 60 per cent of consumers 
would avoid or reduce consumption of milk. Post-approval data does not seem to 
support that (George Paterson, Director General, Foods Directorate Health 
Canada Senate of Canada 1998a). 
 
Senators and witnesses against rBST’s approval used the lack of knowledge 
about the affects of rBST on children to advance their position against rBST’s approval. 
Milk served as a particularly powerful cultural symbol. The focus on children 
consuming milk served as a persuasive argument because of the difficulty of challenging 
the common-sense belief, and the health professional endorsements, that children must 
consume milk in order to grow up healthy and strong. 
It forced me to fight a battle. You could say I was fighting a battle for my 
children. I did not want my children or anyone else's children in Canada to be 
exposed to this (Lorraine Lapointe, Dairy Farmer, Past Director of the Ontario 
Milk Marketing Board, Senate of Canada 1998d).  
 
Consumers will then not have the choice that was being spoken about this 
morning. If they did have the choice, who would be paying for that choice? It 
would be the people who had the concerns. That is usually how the scenario 
plays out. They would end up having to pay more for their milk and their 
children may not get enough milk (Peter Dowling, Member of the National 
Farmers Union National Executive and a Dairy Farmer, Senate of Canada 
1998d).  
 
Also, the gaps analysis talked about the impact on neonates, but as I understand 
the JECFA assessment, that issue was never examined. We know that issue is 
important because children drink more milk, and based on their size, any intake 
has a greater impact than it would on adults (Senator Spivak, Senate of Canada 
1998f).  
 
I am concerned in these hearings about the cost benefits of this. I was in the 
garage one day where I usually have my car repaired, and a guy walked up to me 
and said, "I have seen you on TV. You are looking at that thing that they give to 
cows for milk. I am worried. I have three children. If I feel that this might not be 
tested fully and not good for the children, they will not drink milk anymore." If 
the children stop drinking milk, it will certainly have an effect on their health and 
their development (Senator Robichaud, Senate of Canada 1999a).  
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Before I ask you a couple of questions, I should reveal my own personal bias. I 
have been pretty strongly against this all along. Last night, my youngest son 
informed me that if this is ever introduced into the milk pool in Canada, not 
another drop of milk will go into their house, ever. There is a predisposition to 
breast cancer in his wife's family. They are not even going to think about risking 
it (Senator Milne, Senate of Canada 1998e).  
 
Baron Blois, the President of the Dairy Farmers of Canada, focused his 
testimony on Health Canada and the drug approval process. He argued that the “drug 
approval process is paramount” and consumers must be assured the process is credible 
otherwise the Dairy Farmers of Canada will hold Health Canada responsible for their 
losses (Baron Blois, President of the Dairy Farmers of Canada, Senate of Canada 
1998c).  He stated that the Dairy Farmers of Canada would wait for a credible decision 
and than they would begin addressing consumer concerns and labeling.  
 
First, I go back to what I said originally. We must have a credible process of 
approval before that discussion with the consumer even begins (Baron Blois, 
President of the Dairy Farmers of Canada, Senate of Canada 1998c).  
 
Meanwhile other dairy representatives and Senator Whelan stressed that farmers must 
make a firm commitment against rBST in Canada.   
My concern has been that the Dairy Farmers of Canada has not taken a strong 
enough stand. You have not said anything in your paper about the fact that we 
have built a record of performance across this nation without using any of these 
artificial hormones (Senator Whelan, Senate of Canada 1998c). 
 
There are many arguments against using rBST. The number one argument 
against it is that consumers do not want it… Consumers have told us that if rBST 
is used in Canada, they will stop drinking milk (Tim Finkle, vice-president of the 
National Dairy Council of Canada, Senate of Canada 1998c).  
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3.3.2 Consumer Choice and Labeling 
 
The option of providing consumers with a choice between rBST derived milk 
and non-rBST milk was discussed several times throughout the inquiry. The following is 
a range of perspectives on labeling that participants offered: 
…in certain products, they (Canadians) will still want to exercise choice about 
whether they want to consume that product. That is particularly important in 
something which is as pervasive a product as milk. Senator Fairbairn mentioned 
that earlier (Ian Shugart, Visiting Assistant Deputy Minister, HPB Transition, 
Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998d).  
 
In other words, they would be interested in having the milk labeled. I think a lot 
of consumers would want to know what they are drinking (Senator Spivak 
speaking to Mr. Blois, President, Dairy Farmers of Canada, Senate of Canada 
1998c).  
 
If Health Canada, based on that rat study, says it is safe, mothers might want to 
be extra cautious. Surely they have the right to know. If we do not label it, they 
will not be able to determine whether they should give their children milk which 
has rBST in it or does not have rBST. I think that is another very important issue 
you might want to address in your review of the department (Senator Spivak, 
Senate of Canada 1998d).  
 
We hope that Health Canada will have a credible process and will do its job in 
reassuring the public sufficiently to dispense with labeling (Lise Beauchamp, 
Senate of Canada 1998c). 
 
Several witnesses argued that the costs of segregating milk, separate pick-up 
runs, and the cost of separate labeling makes labeling too costly.  
Common sense dictates that consumers must be heard and, therefore, offered a 
choice of milk with or without rBST. Offering this choice will increase the cost 
of milk due to segregation at pickup, delivery, and processing. These added costs 
should not be borne by consumers, but must be absorbed by farmers wishing to 
use rBST on their herds. We will not accept the American response to the 
introduction of rBST under any circumstances. In that country, consumers paid a 
premium for milk produced without the assistance of rBST (Tim Finkle, vice-
president of the National Dairy Council of Canada, Senate of Canada 19998c).  
 
I heard a representative from Monsanto at the hearing say to the media that, "We 
believe that consumers should have a choice. We will champion that. Well, yes 
in Canada there is a problem about pooling, but we will help them manage it 
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(Lorraine Lapointe, Dairy Farmer, Past Director of the Ontario Milk Marketing 
Board, Senate of Canada 1998d).  
 
In contrast Robert Bell of Monsanto did not see segregating milk as a problem. 
He pointed out that organic milk is offered in Ontario.  
From the processing standpoint, one of the issues was the question of choice. 
Now we are starting to get that. Organic milk is now available in Ontario. That is 
what the processor was concerned about, separating out milk supplies (Robert 
Bell, Monsanto witness and veterinarian, Senate of Canada 1998a).   
 
Shiv Chopra did not support labeling. He stated “You are looking at the entire 
population. Children, pregnant women and old people will be consuming, and they are 
not making any choice. Labeling does not help” (Shiv Chopra, Bureau of Veterinary 
Drugs evaluator and gaps analysis team member, Senate of Canada 1999a).  Angela 
Rickman of the Sierra Club gave a unique spin to the debate on labeling: 
Labeling of GM food is essential, but we should revisit the implicit assumption 
that if Monsanto made it, it must be good for us. In a democracy, the public has 
the right to determine which technologies are used in their communities and, 
similarly, which drugs. We do not want the safety of our food determined by 
large, unaccountable multinationals like Coca-Cola and Monsanto. We do not 
want Canada arguing against the precautionary principle in setting food 
standards and WTO challenges (Angela Rickman, Deputy Director, Sierra Club, 
Senate of Canada 1999b). 
 
 
3.3.3 Benefits and Risks   
 
 Witnesses from the National Farmer’s Union, the gaps analysis team, consumer 
and citizen group representatives, and Senators put forth that rBST is both unwanted and 
unneeded.  This lack of benefits as Jones (1999) also identified was a major obstacle for 
Monsanto’s success in getting Nutrilac approved. These arguments involved defining 
health and safety as prevention and avoidance rather than management and surveillance 
of dangers.     
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Do we just grab onto anything that any company brings forward, requesting to 
sell it to farmers? Are we going to inject this hormone into cows to produce more 
milk just so that farmers can make more money? We talk about economics, but 
social and economic concerns are combined. I do not care what you said in the 
press release; you cannot separate them from one another (Senator Whelan, 
Senate of Canada 1998d).   
 
Farmers, consumers and processors do not want it. When we say that, the 
question that comes back is who does want it (Peter Dowling, Member of the 
National Farmers Union National Executive and a Dairy Farmer, Senate of 
Canada 1998d). 
 
We are always over quota. Our cows will produce. With good management, you 
do not need a drug to make those cows milk. That is how strongly I feel. There 
are many efficient farmers in our area. They do not want it. The consumers do 
not want it. The processors do not want it. Who really wants it? There has been 
much time and money spent on discussing this subject today for so few farmers. 
How many dairy farmers are there in Canada? Not many, compared to the money 
that is being spent on a product that we do not want and we do not need. We can 
produce the milk (Lorraine Lapointe, Dairy Farmer, Past Director of the Ontario 
Milk Marketing Board, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
Why would they introduce a product that is not curing anything, with those 
ramifications? Again, we repeat the list over and over. No one wants it. Why are 
we spending all this time and money on rBST? Why have I devoted 10 years of 
my life fighting this? Mrs. Lapointe and our organization have also devoted 10 
years to this fight. It is clear to us that we do not need this (Richard Lloyd, 
National Farmers Union, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
We are not going to feed the world with this drug. I guarantee you that. These are 
the same folks that brought us the "Green Revolution." We have many fewer 
farmers now than we did 20 or 30 years ago. We have more people going to bed 
hungry than ever before in the history of the world, so I do not think that this is 
about feeding the world (Anthony Pollina, Senior Policy Advisor, Vermont 
Public Interest Research Group, Senate of Canada 1998g).  
 
This section reviews testimony of witnesses and Senators who argued that 
because rBST is a production drug with no therapeutic benefits Health Canada must take 
this under consideration in the decision.  
Risks to human health include the fact that rBST is a non-therapeutic drug which 
is unnecessary. It does not improve the milk or the cows. It does not have any 
nutritional attributes (Peter Dowling, Member of the National Farmers Union 
National Executive and a Dairy Farmer, Senate of Canada 1998d).  
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As you know, rBGH is a production drug. It is not a therapeutic drug. It does 
nothing for society, whatsoever. It does not cure disease; it does not benefit 
consumers or society. Its only purpose is to force cows to make more milk. 
Given this complete lack of benefit, there should be absolutely no risk at all to 
consumers from its use (Anthony Pollina, Senior Policy Advisor, Vermont 
Public Interest Research Group, Senate of Canada, 1998g).  
  
… the criteria of safety, quality and efficacy as is used on therapeutic products is, 
to my way of thinking and to many people's way of thinking, inadequate for the 
non-therapeutic application (John Verrall, Senate of Canada 1998f). 
 
It is risk assessment, not risk management. Under risk management, I believe I 
would absolutely agree to it when you have a drug that might prevent something 
like cancer and that would be beneficial to mankind. However, here you have 
this whole other class of drugs, and that is quite a different proposition (Senator 
Spivak speaking to Len Ritter, a former Health Canada, Senate of Canada 
1999c).   
 
As a non-scientist, I would say that you are on the side of safety, particularly 
when you are talking about a production drug. If this drug were going to cure 
AIDS or cure a headache, for that matter, you would be willing to suffer side 
effects. You take your allergy medicine, you get drowsy, and that is okay. There 
is a reason for the side effect. However, in the case of a production drug, there is 
no reason for there to be any risk to anyone, the cow or the consumer, because 
there are no benefits (Anthony Pollina, Senior Policy Advisor, Vermont Public 
Interest Research Group, Senate of Canada 1998g).  
 
What is the benefit to the consumer? If the consumer benefit is small, then the 
risk should be actually negligible or zero. Why should they be exposed to any 
kind of risk if there is no benefit, the milk is not of greater nutritional quality, or 
even like more of a social benefit or more people being able to have access to it 
because it becomes cheaper or whatever? So you have to look at all of these 
complex issues that are very interrelated in order to come up with the answer to 
should additional studies be required (Thea Mueller, Bureau of Pharmaceutical 
Assessment, Therapeutic Products Directorate evaluator and gaps analysis team 
member, Senate of Canada 1998b).  
 
In contrast, there were participants that argued rBST should not be considered special.   
 
We should be cautious with regard to introducing substances into commerce, 
whether they are therapeutic drugs or non-therapeutic drugs, and regardless of 
whether or not they have this commercial interest. I believe we should be careful, 
period. I would not attach any specific limitation on that concern. It is an 
appropriate concern for all substances at all times, not just in this particular case 
(Len Ritter, former Health Canada Manager and Codex Advisor, Senate of 
Canada 1999c).  
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That does not mean that it is absolutely safe. It means that given current methods 
it is impossible to prove danger. You must contrast that with all sorts of other 
products, as Dr. Pollak has pointed out, that are in common use and that are 
known to be dangerous. We cannot apply an unfair standard to the bovine growth 
hormone or to other similar biotechnology products (Jock McLean, Dean of 
Faculty of Applied Science and Pro Vice Chancellor, Division of Science, 
Swinburne University of Technology, and former JECFA advisor, Senate of 
Canada 1999a).   
 
The review process involves several areas: manufacturing, human safety, animal 
safety and efficacy. In general, requirements for a drug are similar, whether they 
are for a therapeutic drug or a production drug. In other words, you have to make 
sure that that product will be safe. We want to make sure that the standards of 
manufacturing will be met -- that the product is stable, potent, and will meet the 
standard requirements (Ian Alexander, Drug Evaluator, Bureau of Veterinary 
Drugs, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998f).  
 
This debate became much more complicated because of the charges made that 
the normal scientific review had not even been done (i.e. long-term toxicology studies). 
The central debate over the inclusion of additional considerations often revolved around 
divergent values regarding the obligations of Health Canada to Monsanto, and to 
industry in general. 
 
3.4 Decision-stakes and the Regulatory Climate for Industry 
 
 In this section, I analyze the testimony about industry expectations of and 
demands from the drug approval process and what is seen as at stake if Canada does not 
encourage companies to locate here. This section is reviewed with the intention of 
looking at the way participants in the Senate inquiry determined how the drug approval 
process should consider commercial concerns. I begin this section with a brief 
introduction from representatives of Monsanto and Jean Szkotnicki, President of the 
Canadian Animal Health Institute.  
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 Manufacturer’s data submitted for evaluation is considered proprietary 
information and therefore the manufacturer is not required to make all their research 
public. I explore this topic with testimony describing this policy and why it is necessary. 
I then proceed to review challenges to this policy and examine what participants 
identified as problems with proprietary information and the consequences if this 
confidentiality is compromised. I also provide an examination of two different and 
conflicting interpretations over the restriction of what employees within Health Canada 
can or cannot say.  
This issue speaks directly to the heart of balancing private and public interests. 
The decisions stakes that I examine are the challenges of Health Canada achieving 
democratic accountability while providing a favourable climate for commercial 
ventures. 
 
3.4.1 Industry Representatives and their Problems with and Expectations 
for the Drug Approval Process  
 
 Two industry representatives stressed that Health Canada’s decisions must be 
based exclusively upon scientific evidence.  Jean Szkotnicki, President of the Canadian 
Animal Health Institute stated: 
I am here to support a science-based approval process for all animal 
pharmaceuticals… Canada is increasingly becoming the last jurisdiction 
approached with a new drug submission because Bureau of Veterinary Drugs is 
viewed as highly unpredictable (Jean Szkotnicki, President of Canadian Animal 
Health Institute, Senate of Canada 1998g).  
 
Ray Mowling, Monsanto’s vice-president of Government and Public Affairs supported 
this position and described Monsanto’s experience with the drug approval process as: 
This particular process with this product has become unpredictable for us…..My 
company and others like us -- anybody who is trying to have a technology 
approved --need to know what kind of a process we must work with (Ray 
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Mowling, Vice- president of Government and Public Affairs, Monsanto, Senate 
of Canada 1998g). 
 
The uncertainty that surrounds the approval process is disconcerting for us and 
does not bode well for others seeking approval for new technologies (Ray 
Mowling, Vice- president of Government and Public Affairs, Monsanto, Senate 
of Canada 1998g). 
 
Next, I would like to discuss the critical path of BST in the Canadian review 
process. It is our intent to continue to encourage and support a review that is 
based on strong scientific evidence and the weight of scientific findings (Ray 
Mowling, Vice- president of Government and Public Affairs, Monsanto, Senate 
of Canada 1998b). 
 
Finally, I will address why the science-based regulatory process must be allowed 
to continue until it reaches a science-based conclusion. Sound, extensive, in-
depth research into the safety and efficacies of BST must be the basis for the 
decisions to be made by Canadian reviewers in deciding whether they will 
approve BST for use and sale in Canada. Should the product be registered, 
farmers and veterinarians can clearly voice their thoughts by either buying it or 
not. If there is no demand, the product will not be used. Any other approach may 
set an unacceptable precedent, implying that approval of a human or animal 
product is not based on scientific findings (Ray Mowling, Vice- president of 
Government and Public Affairs, Monsanto, Senate of Canada 1998b). 
 
In the above section, it is clear that industry representatives Jean Szkotnicki and 
Ray Mowling argued that a regulatory environment must accommodate industry through 
predictability and timeliness. The decision to reject or issue a notice of compliance 
became more than a safety decision or even an agricultural decision. The decision-stakes 
erupted into issues over what kind of regulatory environment do we need in order to 
invite companies to submit products for approval and otherwise invest in Canada’s 
biotechnology strategy.  Here are some comments made by witnesses in regards to the 
need for companies and their (bio)technologies to invest in Canada.  
These increased review times mean our veterinarians and food animal producers 
do not have access to safe and effective animal pharmaceuticals at the same time 
as other countries, many of which we compete with globally (Jean Szkotnicki, 
President of Canadian Animal Health Institute, Senate of Canada 1998g). 
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We need to be fair to the companies that do great work. Each one of us in this 
room benefits from a standard of living that we would not have if it were not for 
some of these scientific developments. I know that as a farmer. I would go as far 
as to say that if you removed many of the advantages that we have because of 
scientific research, probably half of the world would starve. I think Senator 
Whelan might question that (Senator Gustafson, Senate of Canada 1998d).  
 
How do you deal with those people who say they have a right to sell this product; 
that this is not a totalitarian state so you cannot interfere with their rights and 
freedoms? This is what it boils down to (Michael Pollak, Human Safety Panel, 
Human Safety Panel, Senate of Canada 1999a).  
 
Robert Bell of Monsanto stressed that the market can and should dictate the 
benefit of this drug for farmers. He also stressed that the approval process must be 
determined by science. 
Ultimately, based on the science review of products, they will individually 
decide whether they will use a product or not. I am all for a scientific review of a 
product. After that, let us stand behind our scientific review process and allow 
those individual producers to decide whether to use that product (Robert Bell 
Monsanto witness and veterinarian, Senate of Canada 1998g). 
 
If a product passes the hurdles on a scientific basis, it is up to every individual 
farmer to decide whether to use this product or not. The farmers will ultimately 
decide. I have no problem with that. That is fair and honest (Robert Bell 
Monsanto witness and veterinarian, Senate of Canada 1998g). 
 
Several Health Canada managers also stressed that it is in the public’s best 
interest to make decisions on the basis of scientific evidence.  
There are two issues of balance here. One is the scientific implications for human 
and animal health. That is the job of our department. We may have to make some 
changes to the way we go about it, but that is our job. We then go beyond that. 
Some of these new developments have very important ethical, social, and 
economic implications. The Health Protection Branch is not the place where 
economic and social implications can be brought to bear. We then come to 
another question that will have to put back before Parliament as the work that Ian 
Shugart is heading in terms of the renewal of the Health Protection Branch 
moves forward. How can economic, social, and ethical interests be brought to 
bear in the process? One does not want the science and the objective impacts on 
human and animal health to be coloured by those considerations. One wants 
clean advice as to the safety aspects, and then one wants to be able to deal with 
some of these things outside of that with respect to the other issues (David 
Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
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We are struggling with the important question of how to introduce into the 
regulatory and the decision-making process factors other than safety and 
efficacy. Clearly the science is responsible for dealing with those issues, but 
society is raising other issues-ethical questions, social questions, cultural 
questions, and the like (Ian Shughart, Assistant Deputy Minister, HPB 
Transition, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
These passages maintain the dominant position that science is responsible for safety and 
efficacy evaluations implying that laypersons are not to be involved in the assessment of 
these regulatory requirements. Furthermore, they did not acknowledge that science itself 
might be raising ethical, social, and cultural questions.       
Several Senators and witnesses asked if socio-economic issues are considered in 
the review process and several others argued that these issues should be addressed.  
The whole dairy industry is very much protected by the marketing board concept, 
which tells us at this point in time that we do not need to compete with the 
Americans or we do not need to compete economically because of the 
protections that are in place. I see that changing over time, and there may be a 
change of position on this issue because of economic reality. Have you given any 
thought to that (Senator Gustafson, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
Senator, both Mr. Nymark and I, in former capacities, spent a lot of time 
worrying about those issues. I do not think it is appropriate for either of us in our 
capacities as deputy and associate ministers of health to deal with that (David 
Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998d).  
 
Health Canada does not look at the economic benefits, et cetera, or at the damage 
that this drug can do to the whole history of the super dairy herds of the world, 
which have not used this kind of injection to make a cow give more milk. You do 
not look at that part of it at all (Senator Whelan, Senate of Canada1 1998a). 
 
 
3.4.2 Proprietary Information for the Public Good  
 
Mr. Dodge spoke the most about proprietary information. He and Joseph Losos 
argued that proprietary information exists to benefit Canadians. Mr. Dodge argued that 
intellectual propriety rights were created and chosen by governments for the collective 
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good. This collective good is conceptualized as benefiting from the leading-edge 
research and products of proporietary information without the public’s money.  
We must remember that intellectual property rights, unlike human rights, were 
created by governments for the collective good in order to encourage research 
(David Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health Canada, Senate of Canada, 1998d).  
 
…essentially we rely on the protection provided to intellectual property through 
patents to provide the stimulus for research which has benefited us all (David 
Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
First, it is undoubtedly true that over the last half century we have moved, not 
just in Canada but around the world, in a number of areas to strengthen patent 
protection and intellectual property protection in order to encourage research. We 
do less ourselves with money commissioned publicly. We have chosen to use the 
tool of creating intellectual property rights to get the work done, as opposed to 
having government agencies do it themselves (David Dodge, Deputy Minister, 
Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1999d).  
 
Finally, let me address the competitive aspect. This is fundamentally a very 
difficult issue. It is not driven so much by the corporations. We have set up in the 
western world -- and we are part of that system -- a system to try to drive 
research that does not require all that research to be done by public money. We 
use the patent mechanism to do it (David Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health 
Canada, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
 
3.4.3 Proprietary Information: Restricting Access and Corruption 
 
Participants argued that proprietary protections compromise access to the 
manufacturer’s data and unacceptably close the drug approval process to public and 
outside expert scrutiny.  
Proprietary information was, in fact, what I was alluding to and that is, of course, 
a double-edged sword for us. We would certainly like to get as much information 
as we can to the public. On the other hand, the companies submit information to 
us under Canada's agreements and regulations (Joseph Losos, Assistant Deputy 
Minister, Health Protection Branch, Department of Health Canada, Senate of 
Canada 1998f). 
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Protecting commercial information, not only was identified as a significant 
challenge to a transparent drug approval process and public participation, but a challenge 
for Health Canada employees as well.     
…managers decide to whom we will talk, what meetings we will attend, what 
scientific conferences we will attend, what papers we can write and where we 
can write them, and whether we can speak, or whatever. There is complete 
control over the system under the term "confidentiality of proprietary rights 
(Shiv Chopra speaking to Senator Kinsella, Bureau of Veterinary Drugs 
evaluator and gaps analysis team member, Senate of Canada 1999b). 
 
We must also look at the ability of civil servants to protect the public interest. 
The scientists from within Health Canada who have testified before this 
committee have taken brave steps to inform the public about their important 
concerns, and their actions can probably politely be described as "career limiting 
moves." Frankly, I do not know how they have had and continue to have the 
courage, the perseverance, and the bravery to do what they have done. The gag 
order which now prevents them from speaking in a publicly about their 
experiences and concerns does not serve the public interest. We believe it should 
be removed immediately (Jo Dufay, Campaign Coordinator, Council of 
Canadians, Panel on Continuing Concerns, Senate of Canada 1999b).  
 
The information they supply to us and the FDA and authorities in other countries 
is proprietary information. That makes life extraordinarily difficult. It is not like 
science back at the university where you are dealing with everything on the 
public record, in essence. You are dealing with proprietary information that has 
been put together. The great difficulty we all have is how, given the background 
against which we are working, we provide a light into the system which does not 
compromise that proprietary information (David Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health 
Canada, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
 
3.4.4 The Stakes of Releasing Proprietary Information 
 
Participants agreed that proprietary information complicates transparency and 
public participation and that there are consequences for regulators. Health Canada 
managers disagreed with their employees and several Senators disagreed on the severity 
of these complications and challenges, as well as whether or not proprietary protections 
should be removed. Health Canada managers, David Dodge and Joseph Losos, as well 
as Ray Mowling argued that Canadians will suffer if confidential information is released 
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because manufacturers will apply to have their products approved for sale and use in 
Canada:  
If it is compromised in Canada and if developers of these products feel that it is 
compromised in Canada, then unfortunately they will not bother to come here 
because we are 2 per cent of the world market. Citizens and farmers will not 
have available those particular products which are available in other countries 
(David Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
The rules on inventions and the work that goes into them will benefit inventors, 
like Canadian academics, entrepreneurs or companies like ours. If data is 
released -- and, again, this was referenced this morning -- anyone can use it. We 
need rules in line with other countries, or as Dr. Losos said, the developments 
will go elsewhere (Ray Mowling, Vice-President of Government and Public 
Affairs, Monsanto, Senate of Canada 1998g). 
 
If we compromise them, we may find, as I believe Mr. Dodge commented at the 
last hearing, that companies are reluctant to submit applications in Canada 
(Joseph Losos, Assistant Deputy Minister of the Health Protection Branch, 
Senate of Canada 1998f).  
 
Michèle Brill-Edwards, from the Alliance for Public Accountability and a former 
Health Canada manager argued that proporietary restrictions must be removed:  
Second, because we will have more products coming up for approval and 
because we will not have more resources to deal with that, the privilege of 
secrecy that has heretofore been accorded to manufacturers must be dropped. If 
we do not have sufficient reviewer resources to allow reviewers adequate time to 
review material in depth, then there is no way that material should remain secret 
and unavailable to anyone else who may choose to take the time to review it 
(Michèle Brill-Edwards, Alliance for Public Accountability, Senate of Canada 
1998g). 
 
 
3.5 Trade and the Need for a Regulatory Decision 
 
The Senate inquiry extended beyond concerns of rBST’s safety, consumer 
reactions, and domestic economic impacts to include discussion and debate over 
Canada’s trade obligations and global competition. In this section, I examine the demand 
for a decision in regards to Canada’s trade obligations and the international 
competitiveness of Canada’s dairy industry. With this issue, I explore the different 
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descriptions participants gave of Codex Alimentarius and JECFA. I then examine the 
confusion and controversy surrounding the power of Codex Alimentarius to overrule if 
Canada decided to reject a notice of compliance because of human health concerns. I 
present testimony that emphasizes the importance of examining the conflicts of interest 
of international standard setting bodies and evidence by showing that who and where the 
science is done is of importance for reasons related to the value of sovereign decision 
making and the precautionary principle.     
 
 
3.5.1 Descriptions of the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the Joint 
Expert Committee on Food Additives 
 
George Paterson described Codex’s review of JECFA’s human safety 
evaluations on rBST as a source of confidence for Health Canada’s review and decision:  
There are two main routes that we are taking to get further confidence in our 
review. One is our internal gap analysis. The second is the expert panels. A third 
route might also be the fact that the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives 
re-evaluated its opinion, and came out with a conclusion in February of this year. 
That then must go to the Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in 
Food. That committee will meet in September, which is also when our panels are 
scheduled to submit their findings. These are two watershed events; the Codex 
committee meeting in terms of discussing and reviewing the JECFA report, and 
our own expert panels coming in with their reports (George Paterson, Director 
General, Foods Directorate Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998a). 
 
Senator Kinsella asked Len Ritter how important is Codex and he responded “I should 
like to think that it is very important (Len Ritter, former Deputy Minister of the Bureau 
of Veterinary Drugs, Senate of Canada 1999c David Dodge also gave a positive 
description of Codex. 
That is right. The purpose of the Codex is to provide the best international 
scientific basis for all of us to make national decisions. That is helpful, and 
especially helpful in a world where we have some strong trading partners and we 
are trying to find some way to ensure that no abuse is made of science, that 
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health and safety issues are foremost (David Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health 
Canada, Senate of Canada 1999d). 
 
 Jock McLean, a former JECFA advisor that Health Canada asked to testify at the 
Senate inquiry, argued that JECFA is a separate and independent body from the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission but that the Codex Alimentarius does use JECFA’s expert 
evaluations.  
JECFA gives advice to, but is independent of, Codex Alimentarius. There are a 
number of international organizations that actually use the results of JECFA 
independent of the Codex process. JECFA publishes all its work in the open 
literature, and those publications that relate to BST are now in the open literature. 
The most recent volume appeared last week (Jock McLean, Dean of Faculty of 
Applied Science and Pro Vice Chancellor, Division of Science, Swinburne 
University of Technology, and former JECFA advisor, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
  
Scientists, Health Canada witnesses, Monsanto witnesses, and those from the Sierra 
Club and the Council of Canadians also knew that Codex Alimentarius is separate from 
JECFA: 
I share your concern about Codex itself, but the expert committee is a very 
separate group that is composed of regulatory scientists from around the world. 
For example, this last JECFA, which convened in February, is composed of 
approximately 40 regulatory scientists from around the world, including Canada. 
That is different from looking at Codex itself (David Kowalczyk, Senate of 
Canada 1998a).  
 
However, Senators were unfamiliar with Codex and JECFA’s formal relationship: 
 
The question to be asked is: What good are our reviews if the Codex 
Alimentarius -- I think that is it; I can never pronounce that -- says this is great? 
And that is binding now on Canada. And it turns out that the JECFA also based 
its findings on summaries that had nothing to do with raw data (Senator Spivak, 
Senate of Canada 1998b).  
 
I thought you were part of it (Senator Whelan speaking to Jock McLean, Senate 
of Canada 1998d). 
 
There was also considerable confusion as to whether or not Codex could overrule 
a decision to reject approval because of human safety risks.  
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In fact, I think I prefaced my comments by saying that I am not a lawyer and I 
am not here representing any WHO, WTO or United Nations panel. My 
understanding is exactly as you have just articulated; that is, that standards 
established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission are used as reference points 
by the WTO in arbitrating disputes between countries. The extent to which those 
standards that the WTO may refer to have legal meaning is a matter for 
interpretation by an appropriately qualified trade lawyer, which I am not (Len 
Ritter, former Deputy Minister of the Bureau of Veterinary Drugs, Senate of 
Canada 1999c).  
 
My understanding of the Codex Alimentarius decisions is that while they may 
necessarily be binding, they can be used in dispute settlement mechanisms. If the 
Codex Alimentarius, for example, says that rBST is perfectly safe and should be 
used forthwith, and then Canada decides not to use it, then Monsanto can sue the 
Canadian government for loss of profit, as has already happened with Ethyl 
Corp. and the MMT issue. Is this assumption correct (Senator Spivak speaking to 
Dr. Losos, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
Are you saying that if the Codex Alimentarius deems that rBST is safe for use 
and the Canadian government then chooses to say that it is not prepared to 
license rBST, then Monsanto has no basis on which to sue the government for 
lost profits and opportunities under the WTO process (Senator Spivak, Senate of 
Canada 1998d). 
 
In response to Senator Spivak’s question George Paterson responded:  
 
Not being an international lawyer, I will be careful how I respond to that 
question. As long as Canada, as a sovereign nation, had a justifiable rationale -- 
in other words, the health and safety risk assessment was rigorous and valid -- 
then, no, there would be no basis (George Paterson, Director General, Foods 
Directorate Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
3.5.2 Criticisms of Codex Alimentarius and JECFA 
 
Several witnesses and Senators expressed concerns over the power of Codex to 
challenge a decision to reject rBST’s approval. Participants criticized Codex because of 
the lack of access and transparency of this body.  As well, several participants identified 
Codex as a threat to sovereignty to keep rBST out of Canada.  
Senator Hays mentioned Codex. I am sure that you are aware that I have strong 
reservations about Codex and how it operates. People are making decisions on 
behalf of the rest of society, and the rest of society does not know what they are 
doing. I thought you would be aware of all these things when Codex, this great 
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secret body, is going to make a decision on whether food is safe for us. I have 
strong reservations about Codex, and I do not mind telling you that (Senator 
Whelan, Senate of Canada 1998a).  
 
Surely you are not telling me that a strictly undemocratic and bureaucratic 
decision will be made, and that will be it. When we talked about Codex, they had 
nothing to say about that. Someone represents Codex and makes a decision on 
behalf of Canada, but parliamentarians do not know anything about it (Senator 
Whelan, Senate of Canada 1998a). 
 
While most Canadians have never heard of Codex Alimentarius, it is likely to 
have a more decisive role in setting safety standards, including pesticide 
residues, than the Canadian government (Angela Rickman, Deputy Director, 
Sierra Club, Senate of Canada 1999b). 
 
Several witnesses and Senators also criticized Codex and JECFA for being 
composed primarily and/or exclusively of industry representatives.  
By the 1991 Codex meeting, there are more representatives of giant TNCs than 
from government -- 140 from corporations and only 105 from government. 
Coca-Cola alone sent 18, so concerned were they with food safety. Unilever sent 
nine representatives, and Monsanto sent eight. While Codex was initially 
supposed to concentrate on food safety standards for the developing world, 
industrialized countries quickly dominated the process with TNCs and their 
delegations. At the 1993 meeting, Coca-Cola had the largest delegation, followed 
by Nestle. In fact, 48 countries had fewer representatives than Coca-Cola and 
Nestle, including wealthy industrialized countries like Switzerland, the UK, and 
Australia (Angela Rickman, Deputy Director, Sierra Club, Senate of Canada 
1999b). 
 
You are not going to impress me by quoting WHO or FAO. I was associated 
with them for 12 years and I know how they operate. They operate on grants and 
their decisions sometimes depend on who pays their bills. As far as that goes, I 
have as much respect for some of their decisions as hell would have for a 
snowball. Do not try to impress me with them because I know how they work. 
Do not try to impress me, if you are going to go that far, with Codex because I 
know how they work. The big companies sit behind them and tell them what to 
do (Senator Whelan, Senate of Canada 1998a).  
 
In this era of globalization, however, we seem to be getting away from the idea 
that we can do things in a different way here (Senator Whelan, Senate of Canada 
1999d). 
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3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, I examined four specific topics of the Senate inquiry. Each of 
these four topics revealed the trouble and conflict with the prevailing assumptions that 
health and safety are pre-defined entities that can be measured objectively and 
independently of their social context. The dominant science-based decision-making was 
unable to capture the broad and sometimes conflicting meanings of health and safety that 
participants offered throughout the Senate proceedings. Nor did the Health Canada 
employees, several Senators, the dairy representatives, and the citizen group 
representatives have confidence in the scientific evidence to address and anticipate the 
social context in which this technology would be released. Participants recognized that 
science does and should play a role in the decision; however, the difficulty is that 
participants had different ideas on what exactly constitutes sound science and what 
standards of evidence to use.     
The troubles and conflicts with science included methodological errors and 
inconsistencies, distorted and incorrect reporting, and misinterpretations. Science also 
found itself in a predicament over who should be paying for approval data and the 
composition of international and arms-length expert bodies.  Participants of the inquiry 
differentiated between good science and bad science. Management, industry 
representatives, the human safety panel, Jock McLean, and Len Ritter defined good 
science as objective, standard-driven, and efficient.  While the majority of the other 
witnesses also described good science as objective they also defined good science as 
comprehensive and embracing the precautionary principle.  The debates over Codex 
Alimentarius and JECFA particularly revealed the conflict with these two different 
meanings of good science because if Health Canada were to disallow rBST their 
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decision could be challenged on the basis that it was not scientific. Although science is 
required by federal and national law and trade to justify a decision, these opponents to 
rBST’s approval reconstructed the meaning of science and safety. In the following 
chapter, I review these reconstructions of science and safety and the cultural, economic, 
symbolic, technical, and structural resources participants used in the process.
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Chapter Four: Extending Participation and Using Extended Facts 
4.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I examined the testimony of witnesses and Senators 
about four specific issues that complicated the possibility of making a decision on rBST. 
These four issues demonstrated that the rBST debate was complex with no simple 
resolution, because of persistent uncertainties and its potential to cause social, political, 
and economic instability.   
Post-normal science is a project as much as it is a theory and takes as its 
foundation that improving risk management is contingent upon understanding the 
“essential complexities of the task”(De Marchi and Ravetz 1999: 744). Understanding 
the complexities of risk management is in turn about employing extended facts and 
encouraging the participation of extended peer communities.  This chapter examines 
Health Canada use and response to extended facts from such actors. As well this chapter 
examines Health Canada perceptions on who is legitimately qualified to contribute to 
rBST decision-making and in what capacity.   
I begin this chapter with an examination of the reactions of the Senate 
participants towards Health Canada witnesses. I examine the division between Health 
Canada managers and employees and the subsequent alliances that formed with other 
witnesses and Senators. These alliances, although composed of different actors with 
unique interests and backgrounds, utilized similar and/or compatible discursive 
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strategies in an effort to advance their position on rBST’s approval or rejection. More 
specifically, I examine the critical negotiation and reconstruction of the meaning of 
science, health, and governance that occurred in the Senate inquiry.  
 
4.2 Discourse Coalitions 
 
4.2.1 Reactions to Health Canada Witnesses 
 
 There were several instances in which participants criticized Health Canada 
managers. 
Honourable senators, this morning I was quite upset that the first panel seemed to 
be very arrogant in providing you the proper information. (Jo Dufay, Campaign 
Coordinator, Council of Canadians, Panel on Continuing Concerns, Senate of 
Canada 1999b) 
 
The question is, why should we trust you? When we look at the real world, as 
Senator Gustafson has, we see that there are five or six companies that have said 
quite openly that they want to control the world's food production. People who 
have worked for them are on Codex, JECFA, and your human health external 
panel. That has happened… Why should we trust you? Senator Hays has put 
forward the essential question. The public needs to trust you. You should not be 
talking about stakeholders and public relations…Your job is to ensure that you 
are protecting human health. There is another branch of government that looks 
after industry (Senator Spivak, Senate of Canada 1999d).  
 
We have studied the responses from the senior managers in Health Canada. 
Nothing they have said, quite frankly, reassures the public that they can be 
trusted, or that they have been part of a solution to these disturbing problems. In 
the words of Helen Forsey, there was nothing real in what they said. Instead, it 
was like a sparring match, scoring points; truth and falsehood were merely 
incidental (Kathleen Connors, Chairperson, Canadian Health Coalition, 
President, National Federation of Nurses, Senate of Canada 1998g). 
  
Bias in health and management, and bias in policy and management, have been 
introduced through the government appointment to senior positions in Health 
Canada generally, and the Health Protection Branch in particular, of unqualified 
managers who are hostile to the department's legal mandate (Michael McBane, 
National Coordinator, Canadian Health Coalition, Senate of Canada 1998g).  
 
Likewise, their managers must render decisions on the information brought 
forward to them by their reviewers with due diligence. If we look at the BST 
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process, we see that that due diligence has not been served. Let me remind you 
that, when we speak of due diligence, we are including the necessity for the 
reviewers to maintain independence and for the review process to be 
independent. It is not acceptable to introduce an unseen bias into the evaluation 
of a drug (Michèle Brill-Edwards, Alliance for Public Accountability, Senate of 
Canada 1998g). 
 
Positive comments about Health Canada mangers included: 
 
In the course of the review of these programs, we have made a number of 
recommendations. I have been impressed over the last year by the openness and 
cooperation of the management, and by their enthusiasm in implementing these 
various changes (Yves Morin,Vice-Chair, Science Advisory Board, Health 
Canada, Senate of Canada 1998d).  
 
I would like to thank Dr. George Paterson for the openness I have found in trying 
to deal with Health Canada, because we have been writing them letters for the 
past year. Apparently, they were good enough to go into the gaps analysis report. 
You are missing a few that were written since the report's publication, and we 
will supply them to you (Victor Daniel, Toronto, Co-Chairman, Toronto Food 
Policy Council, Senate of Canada 1999b).  
 
The gaps analysis team received mixed reactions. Dr. Ritter, a former Deputy Minister 
of the Bureau of Veterinary Drugs, testified that he found the gaps analysis report 
unprofessional because it contains unsubstantiated personal attacks.   
Moreover, I referred to the "gaps report" earlier. If you have not had the 
distinction of being referred to as a bozo, then I am one up on you. I certainly 
find that kind of commentary to be entirely inappropriate. I consider it to be 
reprehensible. Although I have not taken legal action, I think it is very 
unfortunate that otherwise well-intentioned scientists would reduce the level of 
conversation to the point that it becomes a personal attack. It undermines the 
credibility of what they are setting out to do. It becomes a personal vendetta and 
that is unfortunate (Len Ritter, former Deputy Minister of the Bureau of 
Veterinary Drugs, Senate of Canada 1999c).  
 
The members of the gaps analysis team were also criticized as acting irresponsibly by 
causing unnecessary alarm.    
We do not want to have a weak Health Protection Branch that does not stand up 
to big, bad companies. However, we also do not want to have alarmist people 
coming around and scaring the population where there is no need for fear 
(Michael Pollak, Human Safety Panel, Senate of Canada 1999a).   
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I require that the scientists touch all their bases in their analysis. I found some of 
the testimony of last week disturbing because it inappropriately attacks the 
integrity of the branch and its scientists and creates anxiety in the public, which 
is totally inappropriate (Joseph Losos, Assistant Deputy Minister of the Health 
Protection Branch, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
Conversely, several participants had favourable comments about the gaps 
analysis team.  
The scientists who went public with criticism of this review are heroes (Bill von 
Meyer, independent toxicologist, Senate of Canada 1999a).  
 
First, I agree with the prior witness this morning that the Health Canada 
scientists who did not rubber-stamp the application from Monsanto could be 
described as heroes. There was enough cause for reasonable concern that they 
were correct in saying that this is not a rubber stamp issue and that it requires 
further thought (Michael Pollak, Human Safety Panel, Senate of Canada 1999a). 
 
Finally, I refer to my question or suggestion to you. I would like to, on behalf of 
the group here and particularly the people of Canada, congratulate you for 
appearing here today because it took a lot of courage. On behalf of the group 
here -- and, in particular, on behalf of the people of Canada -- I should like to 
congratulate you for appearing here today. It took a lot of courage to do so. It is 
not something that is easy to do, particularly when three of you took the oath. It 
is very unusual for that to occur (Senator Stratton, Senate of Canada 1998b). 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Divisions within Health Canada  
 
The Senate committee inquiry revealed divisions between Health Canada’s 
management and the Bureau of Veterinary Drugs’ evaluators.  Health Canada 
management witnesses included both scientists and non-scientists, while employees 
were all scientists, which indicated that the rBST controversy was more than a case of 
scientists verses laypersons.  Managers and evaluators were divided not just over 
technical issues but also over different values, beliefs, and interests. These differences 
manifested themselves in different interpretations over the adequacy and conclusiveness 
of the scientific literature, job expectations, and obligations to industry, consumers, 
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citizens, and farmers.  While management and employees agreed that Health Canada’s 
prime objective is health and safety, there was disagreement over what factors should or 
should not be considered in deciding rBST’s regulatory fate.   
The divisions between Health Canada managers and employees were a part of a 
larger division between those espousing the necessity for, benefits of, and requirements 
for objective analysis and rational decision-making and those that demand social and 
economic impacts be taken into consideration. The case of rBST demonstrated that 
different values, interests, experiences, and beliefs produced different conceptualizations 
of the public’s best interest. This lack of consensus on the meaning of public interest 
produced instances where participants, including scientists framed their arguments with 
appeals to beliefs, values, and interests rather than trying to appear as objective and 
neutral.  As well, there were participants striving for an appearance of objectivity that 
met with limited success to be persuasive and appear as competent and trustworthy.  
These moments Ravetz (1999: 648) would argue challenge “the previous belief that 
scientists could and should provide certain, objective factual information for decision-
makers.” He further comments that this belief is “increasingly recognized as simplistic 
and immature.”  
 
4.2.3 Power Struggles and Discourse Coalitions 
An easily identifiable power struggle to emerge within the Senate proceeding is 
that between employees and management. Within this struggle, there was a fight for 
greater autonomy and authority for Health Canada employees. Throughout the Senate 
proceedings there were numerous instances in which the internal conflicts within this 
agency were highlight. These internal conflicts included allegations of corruption and 
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examples of management as serving the needs of industry over the interests of 
Canadians. Other internal conflicts they identified included manager’s training and 
experience as not relevant to health and safety but business, racism, the loss of freedom 
to speak in public, and excessive reprimands.  Witnesses Thea  Muller and Mark Feeley, 
the two non BVD members of the gaps analysis team criticized the first gaps analysis 
report because: 
“First, the scientific issues dealing with the human safety, the animal safety and 
efficacy, have become intertwined with the internal conflict that the rBST 
submissions have generated within the Bureau of Veterinary Drugs. The 
scientific issues are quite distinct from the internal BVD conflicts. Each is 
equally important but each should be examined in its own right (Thea Mueller , 
Bureau of Pharmaceutical Assessment, Therapeutic Products Directorate 
evaluator and gaps analysis team member, Senate of Canada 1998b).  
 
However, Dr. Chopra was adamant that the internal problems within the department are 
negatively impacting the quality of regulatory decisions. Shiv Chopra responded stating:  
 
My colleague Dr. Mueller talks about the conflict. Conflict is not peripheral to 
this. Rather, rBST and other drugs have been central to the conflict. The conflict 
was not that we were unhappy with our own personal jobs, our promotions or 
anything like that. The conflict was that our concern at the BVD, particularly in 
the Human Safety Division, has been that we have been pressured and coerced to 
pass drugs of questionable safety, including rBST (Shiv Chopra, Bureau of 
Veterinary Drugs evaluator and gaps analysis team member, Senate of Canada 
1998b). 
 
The Senate inquiry was a struggle for opponents to rBST’s approval to resist the 
dominant political and economic forces defining safety, food, and agriculture. These 
dominant forces were identified as foreign and corporate control over Canada’s 
agriculture sector, food sources, and regulatory agencies. The contradictions to emerge 
within the dominant scientific and industrial model of economic growth included risks to 
health, economic independence, and citizens’ ability to decide which technologies they 
want in their communities.  
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I adopted O’Mahony and Skillington’s concept of discourse coalition to describe 
the alliances between diverse actors that emerged to challenge, reconstruct, or reinforce 
the hegemony of industrial capitalism and science. O’Mahony and Skillington 
(1999:102) describe discourse coalition as: 
complex intersections of social meaning-making practices…the concept of 
coalition does not presuppose a strongly unified and fixed alliance in which 
coalition members can be subsumed within one cultural framework over time. 
 
They further add that solidarity between actors within a discourse coalition is contingent 
upon the specific issue at hand as actors may disagree on other issues.  
The concept of discourse coalition is utilized in my research to capture how 
participants combined and rearticulated ideas, resources, arguments, and knowledge to 
their advantage. Murphy (2001) provides a useful description of how actors produce 
competing rhetorical positions to their advantage. Murphy (200: 280) states that “how a 
social problem is defined - as primarily economic, political, or scientific - affects what 
resources figure into the solution. 
 
4.3 Competing and Compatible Meanings of Health and Safety 
4.3.1 Sources of Knowledge on Health and Safety 
 
Health Canada witnesses showed that there are many different possible sources 
of knowledge on the health and safety of rBST. I have divided these sources in two 
types: formal and informal. Formal sources included manufacturer’s data, studies on 
other rBST products, other countries’ evaluations, and published literature. The formal 
sources management turned towards the two external panel’s conclusions, JECFA, 
Codex Alimentarius, Food and Drug Administration (F.D.A) and the U.S Post Approval 
Monitoring Program (PAMP, manufacturer’s data in an effort to demonstrate the breadth 
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of scientific studies and to use as examples of expert affirmations of rBST’s human and 
animal safety and efficacy. Evaluators turned towards these same sources of 
information, however, they criticized these sources for inconsistencies, assumptions, and 
validity of data. Informal sources included past work experiences, personal experiences, 
and tradition. Dr. Chopra and Mr. Dodge were the two Health Canada witnesses that 
shared their personal feelings and experiences that impacted how they approached 
assessing rBST.  
The decreased in-house science capacity and increased reliance upon 
manufacturer’s data was more of a concern for Senators that it was for Health Canada 
representatives.  
Whole departments and areas have been closed down. You would not know 
about it. It comes under "normal cuts" and "budgetary planning" and so on. 
Science is thoroughly compromised. We do not care if Canada does not do any 
science, but science that is concerned with public safety cannot be jeopardized 
(Shiv Chopra, Bureau of Veterinary Drugs evaluator and gaps analysis team 
member, Senate of Canada 1999b). 
 
I think it is a fact, though, in the regulatory field, that we place quite a large 
reliance, or heavy reliance, on data generated by the manufacturer. And I was 
reading Senator Whelan's skepticism regarding this data, but there are checks and 
balances that we can use. We can ask the company to design the studies in such a 
way that we can determine, or have a fair level of confidence, that the data is a 
true reflection of the situation (Thea Mueller, Bureau of Pharmaceutical 
Assessment, Therapeutic Products Directorate evaluator and gaps analysis team 
member, Senate of Canada 1998b).  
 
That is true. That is how our process works. We work on an honour system. The 
companies provide the data. We, unlike the United States, are not inclined to do 
the studies here in Canada under our supervision simply because it is expeditious 
and expedient, because we are a small country. If we had those kinds of 
requirements, no manufacturer will come to sell in our country. So therefore, we 
are willing to receive data from anywhere in the world, on the honour system, 
and we are simply the auditors of science and data are given to us and we 
evaluate and we argue on that, and we ask the company to, if necessary, go back 
and produce more (Shiv Chopra, Bureau of Veterinary Drugs evaluator and gaps 
analysis team member, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
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 4.3.2 Uncertainty v. Best Available Science  
 
Uncertainty was a central preoccupation of those participants with doubts of 
rBST’s safety and opposed to rBST’s approval.  Jones and Salter (2003:21) argue that 
“uncertainty itself is central to the discursive currency of political debates about the 
governance of genetic technologies.”  Uncertainties because of expert disagreements 
provide public interest groups strategies for resistance and influence (Murphy 2001). 
The certainty and uncertainty of technical evidence is a major point of 
disagreement among both scientists and laypersons. There is significant amount of 
testimony dedicated to challenging opposing scientific viewpoints based on methods 
used, experimental design, and reporting of results. Uncertainty of technical evidence, 
for instance, is expressed in terms of accuracy, reliability, validity, controls, and 
replicability. However, the uncertainty of technical evidence was not limited to 
discussion of available studies but also the need for more research.   
Participants of the Senate inquiry had different and sometimes competing 
understandings of uncertainty. Uncertainty was expressed as a “gap” in knowledge. 
Uncertainties were argued to be inevitable and decisions must be made with some 
uncertainty. Uncertainties also arose from the lack of mutual understanding on what 
constitutes safety, economic success, and government responsibilities.  While there were 
several health uncertainties identified based on a lack of adequate scientific investigation 
and long-term studies, the uncertainty of the drug approval process was also identified as 
a significant issue for Monsanto and Health Canada managers.    
Senior managers constructed the goal of the regulatory process as consistency 
through applying best available science. Senior managers stressed decisions must be 
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made on the current state of scientific evidence, whereas Dr. Chopra stressed that we 
must be certain that the risks are fully known before approval is given.  
Our job, to the best of our ability, is to ensure that the food or drugs they take or 
the goods they use are indeed as safe as we know how to make them given 
current science (David Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health Canada, Senate of 
Canada 1998d). 
 
I will make recommendations on the basis of the best science available (David 
Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1999d).  
 
The latest piece is the MacLeod panel piece, and it confirmed our previous work. 
You will notice that I am not using the term "perfectly safe" because no one can 
ever guarantee that anything is absolutely, perfectly safe. For humans, the 
McLeod panel says BST, given the best scientific knowledge available, poses no 
significant risks. That is not saying that it is absolutely safe. One should be quite 
careful in one's use of language (David Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health Canada, 
Senate of Canada 1999d).  
 
Yes, we did. Where is the evidence? No evidence was tabled; it was alleged 
evidence. We were basing our opinion on the most up-to-date scientific evidence 
we believed to be available. If no firm evidence was tabled or put into the record, 
then it was just pure supposition (George Paterson, Director General, Foods 
Directorate Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998a). 
 
What we scientists have to do, in weighing the risks and benefits, is to somehow 
gaze into the future, into the unknown territory, so we are changing the existing 
risk/benefit method by which we have been doing up to now, that you first know 
the risk and, once that risk is eliminated, then you can proceed. Here we are 
taking a risk that we do not know. Therefore, that is the kind of thing that has 
happened with blood and breast implants and other situation (Shiv Chopra, 
Bureau of Veterinary Drugs evaluator and gaps analysis team member, Senate of 
Canada 1998b).  
 
4.3.3 Precautionary Framing verses Consistency 
 
The difficulty of reaching consensus and negotiating satisfactory closure resided in 
the need for both consistency and flexibility in regulatory decision-making. This 
difficulty is apparent in the Senate proceedings on rBST and the drug approval process. 
The position of Health Canada managers rests upon presenting rBST as similar to any 
other drug up for review. They extended this position and argued that if Health Canada 
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imposes higher than ‘normal’ standards for rBST’s approval than all products, including 
human therapeutic drug submissions, must be evaluated with a higher standard and 
Canadians will suffer. However, members of the gaps analysis team argued that because 
of the lack of benefit of rBST, extra measures must be taken to ensure safety.  The 
position of management is compatible with industry and the external human safety 
panel. The employees within Health Canada shared the position that the lack of benefits 
of rBST warrants assurances of zero or minimal risk with the several Senators and 
witnesses who opposed rBST’s approval and safety claims.  
I require that (Health Canada programs) aspire to achieve the level of scientific 
excellence required and demanded of such an organization, that they have in 
place the capacity and the networks to assess absolutely all of the knowledge 
available on whatever subject they are managing, that they have the management 
processes and mechanisms in place to ensure that their work is effective, efficient 
and standard-driven, and that there are mechanisms in place to address all 
differences of scientific opinion to allow for the proper scientific challenge. We 
welcome proper scientific challenge and we want to ensure that expert review, 
both internally and externally, is fully utilized in our health protection role 
(Joseph Losos,  Assistant Deputy Minister of the Health Protection Branch,  
Senate of Canada 1998d).  
Our goal is to have an effective public health partnership where information is 
gathered, analyzed and used, with good, common standards, strong privacy 
protection and a good system for setting priorities and evaluating the results. We 
share that challenge with every jurisdiction in the world (Ian Shughart, Visiting 
Assistant Deputy Minister, HPB Transition, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 
1998d). 
 Many witnesses stressed the importance of Health Canada utilizing the 
precautionary principle in the case of rBST. It is interesting that to some the 
precautionary principle was not new to Canada’s regulatory approach, while others 
argued that it is new and needs to be further explored, and then implemented.  
That sets in perspective how chilling it is to hear senior management refer to 
health regulations as "old-fashioned." As a precautionary principle, an ounce of 
prevention should never be old-fashioned (Michael MacBane National 
Coordinator, Canadian Health Coalition, Senate of Canada 1998g).   
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We must prevent illness. It is chilling to realize that if the proper regulatory 
mechanism does not exist for Canadians, we will create illness rather than 
prevent it. The precautionary principle must be first and foremost… I think 
Canada could be sitting on several Ford Pintos that will blow up in our face if we 
do not ensure that the Health Protection Branch effectively does the job it was 
established to do; that is, utilizing the precautionary principle as the first line of 
defense in protecting public health and safety (Kathleen Connors, Chairperson, 
Canadian Health Coalition, President, National Federation of Nurses Unions, 
Senate of Canada 1998g).  
 
The Canadian public does not care about efficiency and timeliness. They care 
that what comes out of the end of the pipe is absolutely safe. Whether they know 
what it means or not, they are interested in the precautionary principle (Senator 
Spivak Senate of Canada 1999d). 
 
We had a large-scale staff meeting where we invited Justice Krever to talk to us 
and discuss how we could adjust our programs to specifically address and 
embody the precautionary principle. It has implications on policy and on 
organizational structure eventually, as that is the way that we will be moving. We 
do not have a final answer as to how that precautionary principle will work 
(Joseph Losos, Assistant Deputy Minister, Health Protection Branch, Senate of 
Canada 1998d).  
 
The Senate inquiry highlighted the fact that health and safety are not absolute but 
highly variable concepts as different people and groups had different perceptions of 
what constitutes safety. In many instances safety is portrayed as a matter of science 
(Ravetz 2002). However, Ravetz argues that safety is a broader concept than just 
estimates and probabilities of harm. Science, according to Ravetz (2002) has sanitized 
safety, reducing it to mere probabilities and estimates of harm. Ravetz (2002) notes the 
public is concerned with more than estimates and probabilities. Safety judgments, argues 
Ravetz (2002: 262), “need bear little relation to the magnitude of risk.”   
 
4.4 Negotiating and (Re)constructing Science 
There is a long list of positions one can assume when evaluating risks. Whether a 
person searches for proof of harm, or just doubts of a product’s safety, can contribute to 
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different judgments. Whether one starts with the assumption that a product is safe or 
starts with the assumption that a product is hazardous is also a factor in different 
conclusions about the same product. Even more broadly, focusing on what is known 
about a product’s health risks or focusing on what is not known can radically produce 
differing interpretations about the costs, risks, and benefits of a product. Significantly, 
different definitions of costs and benefits contribute to disagreements among people. As 
well, there is the inevitable dilemma of deciding which evidence best predicts the future. 
From this list, I have introduced only a fraction of the problems rBST and other products 
can present to regulatory agencies.   
Barnes (1999: 60) suggests that “controversies involving technical expertise may 
involve chronic conflict not just between incompatible technical analysis but also how 
far technical analysis is appropriate.” He (1999: 61) further adds that “if the limits of 
technical expertise are to be clearly drawn, then a method of delineating them is 
required, and this itself may become a contested matter.” The rBST case demonstrated 
that what is technical or scientific and what is political, economic, or social is subject to 
construction and negotiation. However, I also add to Barnes’ insight, in that the rBST 
case also is about challenging who has a legitimate voice in this redefinition. 
Furthermore, the rBST case is a struggle to have laypersons contribute to technical 
expertise as well as the struggle for scientists to move into a previously restricted area 
and engage in dialogue about social values, ethics, politics, and economics of 
technologies.   
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 4.4.2 Challenging the Authority of Expertise 
 Post-normal science is about changing and challenging the exclusive authority 
and power of expertise. Ravetz (1999) argues that counter-expertise is growing in that 
public interest groups and advocacy groups are capable of engaging in critical dialogue 
with official experts. Counter-expertise in the case of rBST was not limited to those with 
formal scientific training. Counter-expertise also emerged from laypersons that cited 
references to scientific studies they had come across and compared their knowledge to 
that of experts.  
Honourable senators, I am proud to be a dairy farmer. Ours is a family farm. Our 
son and daughter have recently taken over the farm. There is no way that a 
growth hormone will ever be used on our farm. Even if it is approved and 
declared to be "safe" it will never be used on our farm (Joyce Hutchings, Dairy 
Farmer and member of the National Farmers Union, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
Scientific studies and consumer research over the past decade have confirmed the 
wisdom of our opposition to this product. The recent events and disclosures, 
stemming largely from the work of this committee, have further reinforced our 
position (Peter Dowling, Member of the National Farmers Union National 
Executive and a Dairy Farmer, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
 
They are really trying to redefine what a healthy cow is. They are basically trying 
to convince all of us that as long as a cow is giving milk, it must be healthy. 
Farmers recognize what an unhealthy cow is. Monsanto has a very different 
image as to what a healthy cow is and they are redefining the approval process. 
They are redefining risk and manageable risk as opposed to safety. I think they 
are trying to redefine what a healthy cow is (Anthony Pollina, Senior Policy 
Advisor, Vermont Public Interest Research Group, Senate of Canada 1998g). 
 
 
4.4.3 Public Participation  
Post-normal science stresses increased public participation as not only necessary 
for achieving democratically accountable decisions but also for achieving quality 
decisions.  Descriptions of a quality decision are resisted and/or neglected in the 
literature on post-normal science because quality is a highly variable concept among 
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people and its conceptualization is dependant upon social context and people’s interests 
and values. 
Health Canada’s employees scarcely discussed public participation in the drug 
approval process and commented more on the transparency of the drug approval process. 
In contrast, management commented significantly more on both transparency and public 
participation.  In the second last Senate meeting Steve Hindle, the President of the 
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, which is the union of the gaps 
analysis team members stated that: 
The Institute continues to be very supportive of what the scientists are doing in 
their professional life, and also very supportive of their efforts to ensure that 
there is adequate public debate about the management of science within Health 
Canada (Steve Hindle, President of the Professional Institute of the Public 
Service of Canada, Senate of Canada1999c). 
 
He described the work of the gaps analysis team members as not just a matter of 
disgruntled workers desperately seeking more autonomy and greater authority for 
themselves but seeking to expose to the public the corruption within Health Canada’s 
management. This statement presupposes that employees within Health Canada have 
similar demands and values in regards to the drug approval process with the Canadian 
public.   
 Transparency, consultation and participation were three key terms in discussions 
around Health Canada’s drug approval process and the department’s communication 
with the Canadian public.  Health Canada managers had several similarities and 
assumptions built into their descriptions of public involvement in regulatory decision-
making.  
One of the grave problems that has accumulated over time is that the whole 
process of the branch and this particular part of the branch has indeed been a bit 
of a black box. There is no really good public window looking in on how the 
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decisions are made and no opportunity for outside comment at the end of the 
process before a product is given approval for sale in Canada. This is a real 
problem. It is a problem that we face not just in Canada, but one faced around the 
world (David Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998d). 
As far as dealing with these various stakeholders, I do not feel at all threatened 
by them being part of the process. The client is the Canadian public. It all stops 
with me, and that is the bottom line. If these stakeholders include the consumer 
groups, the advocacy groups, and the industry groups, that is all right. Let them 
come. They can discuss and lobby me. I am lobbied by dozens of these people a 
day. …Their involvement does not necessarily mean that we are being unduly 
influenced by either side. The bottom line is that we are the backdrop for health 
and safety. That is the only reason we are there (Joseph Losos, Assistant Deputy 
Minister, Health Protection Branch, Senate of Canada 1999d).  
 
Dryzek (1997: 75) describes the discourse of administrative rationalism as built 
on the premise that the public interest is a unitary concept in which the “discovery and 
application of the public interest is itself a technical procedure.” He also argues that 
administrative rationalism enlists and organizes scientific and technical experts into “the 
bureaucratic hierarchy of the state” (Dryzek 1997: 73). Administrative rationalist 
discourse emphasizes the role of the expert rather than the citizen. This model was 
altered in the Senate inquiry as citizens, farmers, Senators, and laypersons stated which 
experts they trusted and did not trust. They demanded a voice on which expert advice 
Health Canada ought to depend upon.    
Senior officials at Health Canada overall emphasized the importance of 
international bodies such as Codex and JECFA as well as other countries, largely the 
United States, evaluations and approval status of rBST. The use of external panels, other 
country’s evaluations, and international experts are examples of extending the peer 
community by bringing in more expert opinions. This is a foundation of post-normal 
science. However, there was conflict over the department’s use of these bodies for 
several reasons such as the inability to apply the precautionary principle, sovereignty, 
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and independence of these organizations and other countries drug approval processes. 
This conflict is important because it highlights that if post-normal science is to produce 
democratically accountable and quality decisions, the background and composition of 
extended peer communities must be in line with the values and interests of Canadians. 
Consequently, a challenge with post–normal science is that by bringing in more 
‘players’ there is also the increased risk that there is an imbalance in terms of 
representing a diversity of perspectives, experiences, and interests. As well, the 
operations and decisions of these extended peer communities also pose challenges in 
terms of citizens accessing and engaging in dialogue with these expert bodies.   
Post-normal science requires increased public and expert participation and 
considering extended facts. However, the pragmatics of doing so is potentially difficult 
both logistically and financially.  As Senator Stratton stated to Mr. Dodge:  
You said you were addressing the process by which you will handle these new 
biotech ideas that will be coming across your plate in the future in ever 
increasing numbers. The last thing we want, and I am sure the last thing you 
want, is an ongoing process where every time a new product goes for approval 
we have this kind of hearing. This is really not the way to go (Senator Stratton, 
Senate of Canada 1998d).  
It is difficult to argue who from Health Canada is or is not a post-normalist. Dr. 
Chopra does bring in what can be defined as post-normal insights. However, one glaring 
instance emerges in his testimony that reinforces the dominance of scientific expertise in 
resolving regulatory issues. Dr. Chopra gave considerable testimony admonishing senior 
managers if there specific training and background is not in science.  
Those are our concerns, people who are in the science and who are being told by 
people who are not scientists -- they are saying we have to move on post-
thalidomide. We have to have new things, we have to make money, and those 
kinds of concerns. We just are unable to deal with it any more. Mr. Dodge and 
Dr. Lachance, in another department, also talk about the qualifications of the 
people in Health Canada who supervise us. They claim that the authorities who 
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are supervising us are also scientists. That is a patently false statement. There is 
not a single veterinarian in the department above us (Shiv Chopra, Bureau of 
Veterinary Drugs evaluator and gaps analysis team member, Senate of Canada 
1999b). 
 
 
4.5 National Identity, Government Duty, and Sovereignty 
 
 Throughout the Senate Proceedings emerged themes about national identity, the 
duty of government, and sovereignty. Shiv Chopra’s testimony emphasized that 
Canadian standards are and should be better and not just the same as other countries. In 
comparing Canadian milk with U.S milk, he had this to say: 
There are other differences. Canadian milk is of a higher quality, if I can be so 
nationalistic. There are standards that Agriculture Canada here and there are 
supposed to use. I believe their standard is 750,000 cells. If your milk contains 
more than 750,000 of these damaged cells in the milk, then that milk should be 
rejected. I believe in Canada it is 500,000 as the maximum limit, although our 
farmers try to bring it down to less than 150. These are the kinds of differences 
that do exist in the U.S. producing patterns and Canadian producing patterns 
(Shiv Chopra, Bureau of Veterinary Drugs evaluator and gaps analysis team 
member, Senate of Canada 1998b).  
 In several instances, Mr. Dodge and Mr. Losos pointed out that the problems 
identified in the Senate committee are global problems and they stressed that these 
problems are not unique to Canada.  
There is no really good public window looking in on how the decisions are made 
and no opportunity for outside comment at the end of the process before a 
product is given approval for sale in Canada. This is a real problem. It is a 
problem that we face not just in Canada, but one faced around the world (David 
Dodge, Deputy Minister, Health Canada, Senate of Canada 1998d).  
In the Senate proceedings we learn that there is a strong push for Health Canada 
to return to having complete control over the regulatory process.  The reasons for this 
include the desire or necessity to have a central body to be held responsible if things go 
wrong (i.e. more risk and economic loses).  More precisely, the public acceptance of 
extended peer community advice depends on having a government agency that is the 
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principle decision-maker and utilizes the advice of extended peer communities that are 
not affiliated with industry and utilize the precautionary approach.  The credibility of 
expertise is shifting away from legitimating knowledge based on claims of objectivity 
but rather on their stake-holder alliances.   
 If Health Canada is to expand the pool from which technical evidence is 
selected, there are reasons emanating from the Senate inquiry that Canadians will 
demand that this government body cannot abdicate its responsibilities in this process of 
extending peer community participation. As well, the acceptance of extended peer 
community input is dependant upon public perceptions of credibility, value similarities, 
and competency. Transparency of this extended participation was also a concern for 
Senators, citizen interest groups, and Health Canada employees.  
 
4.6 Conclusions 
I did not attempt to find the answer as to how the rBST case should have been 
decided.  However, I hope that I have demonstrated that in any instance a neat solution 
for all affected parties was highly unlikely given the strong opposing viewpoints, 
definitions, interests, values and stakes with rBST. Post-normal science is about 
achieving quality decisions. However, quality is in itself a problematic term because of 
the diverse and sometimes opposing meanings of what is a quality decision. As Ravetz 
and Funtowicz (1999 642) point out “...there is no monopoly of true interpretations of 
post-normal science; that would be contradictory to its message.”  
The two ideas participants did agree upon is that health and safety is important 
and that science has a role in determining the health and safety of rBST. Participants 
however disagreed on what constitutes sound science, what authority should science 
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have in deciding rBST’s approval, the place of socio-economic concerns in the decision- 
making process, and who should participate in the decision-making and in what 
capacity. The testimony of Health Canada managers was consistent with the dominant 
model of regulating risks and managing technology. This dominant model is premised 
upon the assumption that risks are measurable. Science is conveyed as the only means 
by which the truth about hazards can be discovered. Scientists must study risks 
objectively and separate their analysis from the social, economic, and political context 
surrounding technology. However, the Senate inquiry demonstrated that what is 
considered as scientific activity was subject to construction and negotiation by both 
scientists and laypersons. There were critical revisions as to what counts as scientific 
activity as the boundaries between the technical and safety, economics, and social issues 
were contested. It is in these boundary negotiations the possibility and necessity for a 
post-normal science emerged. 
In the Senate hearings, the broader commitment of the federal government to 
promote technological innovation and in particular biotechnology was extensively 
discussed. Health Canada managers formed an alliance with industry representatives in 
terms of trying to establish that the regulatory protocol for rBST’s approval or rejection 
must be efficient, standard- driven and a decision must be made with the “best available 
science.” 
In contrast, the Health Canada employees found support and an alliance with the 
dairy industry, most Senators, the citizen interest groups, Bill von Meyer, and John 
Verrall. This alliance utilized the symbolic power of milk as a nutritious, pure, and 
wholesome and the importance of milk to children’s diet to advance their position. They 
argued that Canada’s dairy industry and the food supply in general must be protected 
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from foreign control and unaccountable large corporations. This coalition, in particular 
the dairy farmers and the dairy processors challenged the assumptions of senior 
managers and Monsanto that the primary goal of dairy farming is economic efficiency. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The Senate inquiry was a difficult text to examine in terms of obtaining a 
balanced representation of witnesses and Senators because some witnesses testified 
more than others, and Senators asked different questions to different witnesses thus 
affecting the flow of topics discussed. Another short-coming of examining this text is 
that there were a relatively small number of participants, although the participants that 
did testify were from diverse backgrounds with different interests.  Nonetheless, the 
Senate inquiry transcripts provided many insights into the controversies of rBST and the 
inadequacies of Canada’s regulatory framework. The Senate inquiry gave way to an 
interesting and informative study on the troubles of science-based decision-making, and 
the strategies to improve and democratize the drug approval process.   
I begin this chapter with a review of my findings and their implications.  In this 
chapter, I also examine several developments that have taken place since the Senate 
inquiry and Health Canada’s decision to issue a notice of noncompliance. The purpose 
of this chapter is to examine the legacy of rBST and how Health Canada has responded 
to the contents of the Senate inquiry. I give some concluding reflections on the areas of 
post-normal science that need further exploration and clarification.   
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5.2 Summary of Findings 
Incidences of mastitis could ideally be measured and determined if there is an 
increase that correlates with rBST treatment. However, rBST and the concerns with 
mastitis was an issue loaded with technical disagreement. There was no consensus 
among scientists that rBST does or does not directly cause mastitis. Experts debated this 
seemingly scientific matter focusing on issues of the validity, reliability, and consistency 
of data.  
In addition, in order to draw a conclusion required a value judgment on the 
capabilities and capacities of dairy farmers to control mastitis outbreaks. Those trying to 
dismiss mastitis as a concern with rBST argued that good management practices 
determine mastitis outbreaks. Dairy farmers were reluctant to be labeled as poor 
managers. Joyce Hutchings described her visit to a New York dairy farm that used rBST 
and she provided a vivid picture of the losses this farmer and his neighbour endured after 
treating their cows with rBST. These losses included financial losses due to fines and 
illness. The farmer that she visited almost lost his farm and his family.  She also learned 
from this farmer that his neighbour’s experience was far worse and he was too ashamed 
to talk about it. Dairy farmers argued that the health of their cows and their farming 
success includes pride and respect in their communities.  
Antibiotic residue was the primary concern with mastitis for dairy farmers, 
Monsanto witnesses, the human health expert panel, and Health Canada managers 
perhaps because concern is not as severe, but much more manageable than antibiotic 
resistance. rBST is only one small contributor to the growing problem of antibiotic 
resistance. Participants were divided as to whether or not to reject this product, and 
whether or not this risk is serious enough that all measures must be taken to stop its 
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spread. Opponents to rBST’s approval argued that in order to control this emerging 
health threat, collective responsibility is required. Health Canada management and 
Monsanto representatives however, did not see rBST’s potential to increase antibiotic 
use as significant. They argued that even if there is an increase of mastitis with rBST 
approval it cannot be refused because rBST it is only one contributor to “potential” 
antibiotic resistance.   
Dairy farmers and processors explicitly stated that consumer reactions to rBST 
milk are their primary concerns. Moreover, labeling was a related topic in which there 
were arguments both for and against labeling. While consumer choice was argued as a 
positive idea, and in some instances a consumer right, opponents to labeling typically 
argued that it is cost-ineffective because of the single pooling and processing system.  
Witnesses that explicitly expressed that they did not want rBST approved often 
supported labeling. This contradiction occurs perhaps because these witnesses, prior to a 
decision, felt they would lose and as a compromise they should at least fight for labeling 
of rBST milk. 
Consumer acceptance and the possibility of labeling milk placed science in a 
difficult position because of the argument that consumer perceptions are just as 
important, and formed independently from the “facts” on rBST’s safety. One strategy 
among opponents to rBST’s approval was to argue that rBST’s approval would cause 
significant financial losses because of negative consumer reactions. These participants 
used consumer reactions to their advantage by linking consumer perceptions of health 
and economics to advance their power. This discursive event was a strategy to resist the 
dominant economic forces of globalization by transforming the goal of agriculture away 
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from economic efficiency, as espoused by Monsanto and Health Canada managers,   
towards a way of life built on community, hard work, and pride in their product.  
Labeling could be interpreted as a means to empower consumers by offering 
them choice. Labeling could be seen as a means to persuade consumers that a product is 
safe, especially if safety is endorsed by a well-known agency such as Health Canada. 
How product is labeled, and how much information will fit on a label, were important 
factors in this debate. As well, the different cost between milk labeled as rBST-derived 
milk v. non-rBST milk was a concern.   
The political economy in which the state and actors are located needs to be 
acknowledged and critically examined if post-normal science is to develop and flourish. 
Post-normal science requires a willingness to reach mutual understanding. For example, 
proprietary information exists so that companies have a greater incentive to develop 
products and gain profits. In the Senate proceedings managers and industry argued that 
propriety protections must be in place. However, proprietary information comes at a cost 
for transparency and access to information for both the public and experts. Proprietary 
protections were defined by management as a necessity whereas critics of rBST argued 
proprietary information is a privilege accorded to industry that must be removed.  
The powers and trade implications of Codex Alimentarius was a heated debate 
because it put to the forefront that Canadians have limited power and authority to decide 
which technologies they want, and to define the health and safety of technological risks. 
Codex Alimentarius also highlighted significant discrepancies between Health Canada 
management and the public, Senators, citizen interest groups, and Health Canada 
employees over the neutrality of this international standard setting and trade-meditating 
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agency.  In an effort to gain legitimacy and power, the latter reconstructed the meaning 
of sound science as one embracing the precautionary principle.  
My findings suggest that it is erroneous to assume that the public interest is a 
given and that health and safety are static concepts. In order for Health Canada to 
address the competing and multiple meanings of safety, and the public’s interest, the 
involvement of a diversity of actors early in the drug approval process is needed.  
In this thesis I uncovered several tenets of post-normal science to emerge 
throughout the course of the Senate committee. I have also argued in this thesis that 
ideology and power are two important factors that need to be examined in an effort to 
uncover resistance to post-normal science. More specifically, the power of authority of 
traditional science is struggling as laypersons and even scientists are questioning its 
claims of objectivity and value- neutrality. Not only did witnesses and Senators question 
these claims but they raised questions as to whether we should even be using science as 
a truth arbiter to settle the diverse interests, values and stakes associated with rBST.  
According to Ravetz and Funtowicz (1999), post-normal dilemmas are not 
reducible to either science or politics. I extend this insight by arguing that the boundaries 
between science and politics, as well as economic and social conditions, were 
unavoidably blurred in the case of rBST.  
Trust is a central theme running throughout the Senate inquiry. The Senate 
inquiry revealed that science is not just a tool to measure risks, but that science is a 
social process that builds public trust and confidence. I suggest that further exploration 
into trust between scientists, policy-makers and the public is crucial. In particular, this 
research reveals that public trust with extended peer communities involves issues of 
choice, control, a disassociation with industry, and values similarity like securing and 
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protecting consumer confidence and promoting the economic sustainability of Canada’s 
dairy industry. To put this more concisely, confidence in technical assessments is only 
one component of trust 
However, participants offered what Gramsci would call counter-hegemonies. 
Witnesses and Senators identified and critically analyzed the contradictions of industrial 
capitalism and science’s authority and claims of objectivity, neutrality, and ability to 
discover the full range of risks of rBST.     
 
5.3 Post-rBST 
On 14 January 1999 Health Canada closed the rBST file by issuing a notice of 
noncompliance for Nutrilac. This decision was announced even though the Senate 
committee had not finished its inquiry. Health Canada closed the rBST file citing the 
scientific findings of the animal health panel for this decision. Despite that several 
witnesses expected Monsanto to resubmit Nutrilac for approval, Monsanto has not yet 
reapplied.   
Much has happened since Health Canada issued a notice of noncompliance for 
Nutrilac.  The BVD scientists swore an oath and sought protection from reprimands and 
threats to their job security. On 14 July 2004 Health Canada terminated these scientists 
without publicly stating their reasons. These scientists had been in several other high 
profile cases and their actions clashed with Health Canada (Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation. 2004). Media accounts, as well as several citizen interest groups suspected 
that rBST was a major reason for the termination of these scientists. Support for these 
scientists after their termination continues. The Council of Canadians (2004) called for 
an independent and public investigation into why these individuals were terminated. 
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Similarly the Sierra Club of Canada is seeking legislation to protect “whistle-blowing” 
employees (2004).   
Throughout the Senate inquiry the precautionary principle was extensively 
debated. Management did not explicitly state that they were against the precautionary 
principle, rather they stated that the precautionary principle must be implemented before 
they could use it on the rBST decision. As well, management frequently refused to 
acknowledge that rBST is different from therapeutic drugs up for approval. Whereas 
dairy representatives, farmers, Senators, Health Canada employees, and the citizen 
interest groups argued that rBST is different from therapeutic drugs and therefore extra 
precautionary measures must be taken. Those advocating a precautionary approach 
emphasized that proof of harm is not required, just doubt.  
Since the Senate proceedings, the Government of Canada has issued the 
document A Framework for the Application of Precaution in Science-based Decision 
Making about Risk (2003) to Health Canada and several other government agencies. 
Upon reviewing this document, I found several differences between this document and 
my findings. This document defines the application of precaution as “the absence of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing decisions where there is a 
risk of serious or irreversible harm” (Government of Canada 2003: 2). While the lack of 
scientific certainty is compatible with the Senate inquiry, this definition is ambiguous 
because it is in the negative. More concisely, this definition does not say for what reason 
the absence of certainty could be used. The meaning and focus shifts if I were to 
translate this definition into the positive such as the absence of full scientific certainty 
shall be used as a reason for making a decision where there is a risk of serious or 
irreversible harm. This document advocates applying the precautionary principle 
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consistently. Managers and industry stressed the need for consistency in the drug 
approval process, while consistency was not an issue for those advocating the 
precautionary principle. A difficult challenge therefore is to develop a drug approval that 
consistently applies the precautionary principle. The process of doing so brings in 
values, interest, and beliefs to the forefront. This document, does acknowledge that 
public involvement is an important component for the application of the precautionary 
principle and this is consistent with my findings.  
 
5.4 Suggestions for Achieving a Post-normal Decision-making Environment 
 Post-normal science is a potentially useful framework for government agencies 
to make complex and controversial decisions like whether or not to approve rBST. 
While the use of extended facts and extended expert and public participation are crucial 
for produce democratically accountable and precautionary decisions, post-normal 
science is underdeveloped in terms of its use in decision-making as well as academically 
the literature typically short and brief. Locating the political economy in which the 
regulators are situated is one such area in need of greater attention. My research 
examined that economic interests may prove more of a formidable challenge than post-
normal science has currently acknowledged.  
 Leiss (2001) suggests that governments move away from science and let 
independent arm’s-length panels take care of the science portion of health and safety. 
Leiss argues that arm’s-length expert panels enhance the independence of science and 
allow governments to more effectively manage risks and make decisions. However, the 
way the public, Senators, and anti-rBST experts reacted towards the human and animal 
safety panels challenges the viability of Leiss’s arguments. My findings indicate that the 
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public expects a strong and accountable agency that does in-house science. This 
resonates with Millstone and Van Zwanenberg’s observation that “new kinds of risks 
emerging in food production chains actually demand greater rather than less reliance on 
the strong administrative  accountability that can be found typical departmental lines of 
authority” (Doern and Reed 2001:371). As well, in the Senate inquiry both witnesses 
and Senators questioned the meaning of the independence of science. They argued that 
there is a shortage of scientists who have not at one point in time consulted with 
industry. 
 In conclusion, post-normal science is a useful concept for exploring alternative 
regulatory arrangements and how decisions can be enhanced both in terms of their 
democratic accountability and in the reduction of risks. However, there are nonetheless 
challenges to its realization in regulatory and policy circles.  In the case of rBST, these 
challenges included the dominant belief that decisions must be based on science and that 
the science must disregard social, economic, and cultural variables. Furthermore, there 
were high economic stakes that diminished the willingness of actors to engage in 
dialogue and reach mutual understanding with each other that is required for a truly 
post-normal decision-making process. Despite these barriers to achieving a post-normal 
science regulatory framework, this research has demonstrated that both Health Canada 
scientists and laypersons worked together and challenged the meaning of science in 
order to accommodate the social and technical complexities surrounding rBST.     
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